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Introduction 
 
“In public health we identify a problem, figure out the causes, look for solutions, and 
implement them. Here we see a vigorous response in the absence of a problem. It’s 
science run amok. Its public health run backwards.” - David Grimes, former chief of the 
Center for Disease Control branch for abortion safety1 
 
 When Wendy Davis left her house in Texas the morning of June 25th, 2013, she probably 
was not aware of the impact she would soon have as a female Democratic state senator. That 
day, she led an eleven hour filibuster that would not only bring her name and reputation to an 
entirely new level in the political realm, but that would bring newfound attention to the 
unyielding issue of abortion legislation. Displaying impressive stamina as she voiced her 
opposition to Texas House Bill 2, a series of restrictive laws that would lead to the closing of 
most of Texas’ 42 abortion clinics,2 Senator Wendy Davis’ performance earned instant attention 
from the media. Her success however was short lived, as Texas Governor Rick Perry proceeded 
to call a second special legislative session, allowing the Republican dominated legislature to 
quickly pass another bill. House Bill 2, signed on July 12th less than three weeks after the 
filibuster, bans abortions after 20 weeks of pregnancy, requires abortion clinics to meet the same 
standards as hospital surgical centers, restricts the administration of medicated abortion, and 
mandates that a doctor have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of the clinic where 
he performs abortions.3 Of the provisions, it is the admitting privileges requirement that has 
garnered the most attention among Texas women and abortion activists.    
 Texas is one of several states that have passed restrictive abortion laws. In 2011, 
legislators in all 50 states introduced more than 1,100 provisions related to reproductive health 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Barry Yeoman, “The Quiet War on Abortion,” Mother Jones, September/October 2001, 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2001/09/quiet-war-abortion/. 
2 Manny Fernandez, “Abortion Restrictions Become Law in Texas, but Opponents Will Press Fight,” New York 
Times, July 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/. 
3 Ibid. 
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and rights. This resulted in states adopting 135 new reproductive health provisions, a dramatic 
increase from the 89 enacted in 2010, and the 77 enacted in 2009.4 Unique to this type of 
legislation is the underlying message that each enactment carries. When asked of the role that the 
various provisions in House Bill 2 played in her decision to conduct the filibuster, Wendy Davis 
responded, “what the bill really was about…was closing women’s access to a very important 
health care service in the state of Texas...women literally are going to lose their access to care.”5 
The law went beyond simply restricting access to abortion, negatively impacting access to 
women’s basic, indisputably beneficial health care services. By imposing restrictions upon 
abortion providers, the bill caused several clinics to close because of an inability to meet the new 
standards. 
 What Wendy Davis was referring to was the Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, 
otherwise known as TRAP laws. Unlike other forms of restrictive abortion legislation that 
require mandatory waiting periods, parental consent, informed consent, or limited insurance 
coverage, TRAP laws target the actual abortion facility and its physicians. This is an effective 
strategy because it no longer targets the woman’s right to choose, but instead the provider itself; 
thereby taking the emotionally charged difficulties associated with deciding to obtain a 
procedure out of the question. 
 Laws regulating clinics in which abortions were performed first emerged in the years 
immediately following the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade6 in 1973. Moving against the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Rachel B. Gold and Elizabeth Nash, “Troubling Trend: More States Hostile to Abortion Rights as Middle Ground 
Shrinks,” Guttmacher Policy Review 15, no. 1 (2012): 16. 
5 “Wendy Davis Speaks at August 5, 2013 National Press Club Luncheon,” The National Press Club, August 6, 
2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y1YEpT82Dbg.  
6 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court ruled 7–2 that a right to privacy under the 14th Amendment 
extended to a woman's decision to have an abortion. The right must consider that state’s interests in regulating 
abortion: protecting prenatal life and protecting women's health. The Court applied a trimester framework to decide 
the degree of state regulation as the time of the pregnancy progressed. 
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Roe decision, which solidified a woman’s legal right to an abortion, several states sought to 
impose strict restrictions on abortion clinics. Since many of the restrictions went beyond what 
was necessary to ensure a patient’s safety, they were struck down in the lower federal courts in 
the 1980s.7  The efforts and types of approaches to restricting access then shifted to a more 
conservative direction, and beginning in the mid 1990s, Republicans in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and Senate introduced legislation to ban “partial birth” abortions, a procedure 
that aborted a semi-developed fetus in a later term of pregnancy. It was not until later in the 
1990s that laws regulating abortion clinics resurfaced. 
  Most TRAP law requirements apply states’ standards for ambulatory surgical centers to 
abortion clinics, even though surgical centers tend to provide more invasive and risky procedures 
and use higher levels of sedation.8 These standards usually impose burdensome structural 
requirements upon the facility, beyond what is necessary to ensure patient safety in the event of 
an emergency. The provisions also often require that facilities maintain relationships with 
hospitals, “provisions that add nothing to existing patient protections while granting hospitals 
effective veto power over whether an abortion provider can exist.”9 Finally, several of the laws 
mandate that physicians performing abortions have admitting privileges with local hospitals, a 
condition that is nearly impossible to achieve. For example, Louisiana requires that abortions can 
only be performed in rooms that are a minimum of 120 square feet; North Carolina requires that 
abortion providers hire a registered nurse who is on duty at all times; and Missouri requires that 
abortion providers be located within 30 miles of a hospital and have procedure rooms that are at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 “State Policies in Brief: Targeted Regulation of Abortion,” Guttmacher Institute, (2014). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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least 12 feet long and 12 feet wide, with ceilings at least 9 feet high and doors as least 44 inches 
wide.10 
 In 2005 alone, twenty-one state legislators considered TRAP bills.11 There were four 
restrictive TRAP laws aimed at abortion providers enacted that year,12 as compared to the 27 
laws that were enacted by 2013.13 In the February 2014 policy briefing for TRAP laws, 
Guttmacher reported that 25 states require facilities where abortion services are provided to meet 
standards intended for ambulatory surgical centers, including provisions requiring specific sizes 
for procedure rooms, specific corridor widths, a set distance from a hospital, and a transfer 
agreement with a nearby hospital. Additionally, 13 states require abortion providers to have 
some affiliation with a local hospital, including admitting privileges or specific board 
certifications.14 Burdensome and unnecessary, the laws place strict regulations on hospitals and 
providers of abortions that do not apply to other medical professionals. 
 This thesis focuses on the recent influx of TRAP legislation since 2000, and whether it 
has had a different impact on women’s access to abortion than previous forms of restrictive 
abortion legislation. It asks why TRAP laws suddenly became so popular, and looks to the 
impact of the laws in certain states in order to determine the actual effects of the laws’ 
enactment. The thesis will explore the way in which TRAP legislation has been successful in 
state legislatures, as well as the specific behavior of the legislators and organizations involved in 
the policy-making process. TRAP legislation enacted in Texas and North Carolina in 2013 
reveals an apparent coordinated effort on the part of pro-life organizations and conservative pro-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Marshall H. Medoff, “The Relationship Between State Abortion Policies and Abortion Providers,” Gender Issues 
26, (2009): 227.   
11 Lisa M. Brown, “The TRAP: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers,” National  
Abortion Federation, 2007, http://www.prochoice.org/. 
12 Ibid. 
13 “State Policies in Brief: Targeted Regulation of Abortion.” 
14 Ibid. 
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life legislators. This thesis will examine this strategy and how its implementation has ultimately 
closed abortion clinics and restricted access to abortion. Most importantly, the thesis will address 
the false claims aimed at supporting the legislation and the actual detrimental effects to women’s 
reproductive choice that the legislation has caused.  
 It is important to understand that TRAP legislation is a relatively new phenomenon that has 
yet to be thoroughly researched. Researcher Marshall Medoff argues that this is primarily due to 
the fact that TRAP laws have really only been enacted since the Supreme Court’s decision for 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey15 in 1992.16 He explains that 
previous studies of restrictive abortion policy have been constructed with unreliable measures, 
most notably the number of anti-abortion provisions passed by a state between 1973 and 1989, 
including gender selection, fetal pain, private health insurance restrictions, spousal notification, 
calls for a constitutional convention on the abortion issue, parental involvement laws, conscience 
clauses for medical personnel, and pro-life license plates.17 As mentioned earlier, however, 
previous restrictive laws are predominantly aimed at the women’s right to choose and are 
fundamentally different than TRAP laws. As Medoff explains, the studies do not reflect a state’s 
political, legal or social environment at the time that the law was enacted. Additionally, the types 
of laws previously examined in studies are merely symbolic, and do no limit women’s access to 
an abortion in the same way as physical requirements imposed on the abortion providers.18  
 In order to fully understand the emergence of TRAP laws and their unique applicability to 
a woman’s access to abortion, a closer examination of the history leading up to the passage of 
new TRAP laws is needed. Chapter 1 provides the historical context necessary to understand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
16 Medoff, “Social Policy and Abortion: A Review of the Research.”  
17 Marshall H. Medoff and Christopher Dennis, “TRAP Abortion Laws and Partisan Political Party Control of State 
Government,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 70, no. 4 (2011): 954.  
18 Ibid., 955.  
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how the TRAP law strategy is a coordinated effort between conservative Republicans and 
socially conservative religious groups. Since the Catholic Church played an important role in 
shaping the conservative Republican Party ideology on social issues, the chapter examines the 
religious influence on the abortion debate and the formation of the Christian Right. The 
republican alliance with the Christian Right as a means to an electoral strategy is seen most 
clearly in the presidential elections of Nixon, Carter and Reagan and explains the conservative 
pro-life ideology that is recognized within the ideology of Republican Party members today.  
 Chapter 2 delves further into the issue of TRAP laws, explaining the emergence of the 
specific legislative strategy since the end of the 1990s. With crucial data compiled from the 
Guttmacher Institutue, as well as NARAL Pro-Choice America, the chapter traces the increasing 
dominance of TRAP laws in state legislatures. A study of the model legislation promoted by 
Americans United for Life reveals a clear connection between pro-life organizations and state 
governments.  
 To contextualize the impact of the model legislation and the conservative, pro-life push for 
restrictive TRAP laws, Chapter 3 examines Texas legislation that was enacted in the summer of 
2013. Texas House Bill 2, despite vehement opposition on behalf of Democratic legislators in the 
state, represents the effect of a coordinated pro-life strategy at the state level. The recent closure 
of several abortion providers in Texas is shown to be a direct result of the law’s requirement that 
abortion clinicians obtain admitting privileges from a nearby hospital.  
 In addition to admitting privileges, TRAP laws often require abortion provider facilities to 
meet the same standards as ambulatory surgical centers. Chapter 4 serves as the critical link 
between the actual TRAP law and the conservative effort to enact it. Looking to recent 
legislation enacted in North Carolina in 2013, the discussion reveals the false pretenses under 
	   10	  
which Republican legislators defend TRAP laws, namely, as a means to improving women’s 
health and safety. The law, Senate Bill 353, severely limits women’s access to the state’s 
abortion providers by imposing standards that force the facilities to shut down. 
 The final chapter concludes with a discussion of the empirical evidence that exists with 
respect to the enactment of TRAP laws. Drawing upon the findings of Marshall Medoff and 
Christopher Dennis, it makes clear that the TRAP law strategy is unique, and different from 
previous restrictive abortion policy, in the sense that it targets the providers rather than the 
individual woman’s right to choose. The Republican led strategy, despite its assertions that the 
new laws serve to make abortion safer for women, actually has the opposite effect, and the 
empirical evidence supports this. There is a clear association between TRAP legislation and the 
decline in the number of abortions nationwide, and it is happening in states where Republicans 
control both the legislature and the governor’s office.  
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Chapter 1: The Christian Right 
 
“Every legislator, every doctor, and every citizen needs to recognize that the real issue is 
whether to affirm and protect the sanctity of all human life, or to embrace a social ethic 
where some human lives are valued and others are not. As a nation, we must choose 
between the sanctity of life ethic and the "quality of life" ethic” – President Ronald 
Reagan19 
 
 At the time he signed Mississippi’s latest abortion bill into law in 2012, Governor Phil 
Bryant (R) declared, “today you see the first step in a movement to do what we campaigned 
on…to try to end abortion in Mississippi.”20 Lieutenant Governor Tate Reeves followed suit, 
declaring that the bill “should effectively close the only abortion clinic in Mississippi.”21 This 
bill was one of several restrictive abortion laws that were emerging across the nation. According 
to legal correspondent Dahlia Lithwick, the successful enactment of the laws is attributable to a 
legislative strategy that has been promoted under the “guise of a tender concern for women, their 
vulnerable bodies and unstable emotions.”22 This false concern for women’s health has been 
utilized by pro-life advocates as a legislative strategy for restricting abortion since the early 
1990s, and has resulted in the successful closing of abortion clinics across the nation. In fact, the 
focus on women’s health is only a small component of a much broader set of objectives aimed at 
restricting women’s access to abortion. In order to fully understand the legislative approach, it is 
necessary to examine the underlying ideology and political origins of the pro-life position on 
abortion, which is primarily informed by the concerns of the Christian Right.  
 This chapter will trace the rise of the Christian right from the early nineteenth century to 
the end of the 1980s. It will first look at the impact of grassroots feminist movements in the 
1960s and the increased attention given to women’s reproductive rights. The chapter will then 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Priests for Life, “Presidential Pro-Life Convictions,” Political Responsibility Center, accessed April 24, 2014, 
http://www.priestsforlife.org/government/reaganabortionquotes.htm.  20	  R.B. Gold and E. Nash, “TRAP Laws Gain Political Traction While Abortion Clinics-And the Women They 
Serve-Pay the Price,” Guttmacher Policy Review 16, no. 2 (2013): 10.	  
21 Ibid.  
22 Dahlia Lithwick, “Finally!” Slate, November 13, 2013, http://www.slate.com/. 
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consider the position of religious groups with respect to abortion and contraceptives at that time. 
Then, it will move on to the 1970s and 1980s, in which religious groups that were traditionally 
supportive of reproductive rights began to change their position, becoming more conservative. 
The chapter will assess how this change in the 1970s and 1980s impacted the constituency of the 
Republican Party, as seen through the presidential elections of Nixon, Carter and Reagan. Lastly, 
it will address the overarching influence that the Catholic Church had in reshaping the 
Republican Party ideology, especially with respect to its position on abortion.  
 
The Early Stages 
 For the first half of the nineteenth century, pregnancy was regarded as a private matter, 
and first and second trimester abortions faced very little legal regulation.23 In fact, it wasn’t until 
the second half of the nineteenth century that abortion began to emerge as a social problem. 
Newspapers began to run accounts of women who had died from “criminal abortions,” and 
physicians began arguing that abortion was both morally wrong and medically dangerous.24 
During the twentieth century, attitudes toward abortion continued to change as the practice of 
medicine became professionalized and regulations, including those on abortion, were legally 
mandated.25 Author Kristin Luker explains that at first, the medical profession’s control of 
abortion gave rise to a wide variety of abortion practices, “permitting a considerable degree of 
arbitrariness in the decision.”26 For the first half of the twentieth century, there was little formal 
regulation of abortion procedures. Since the safety of the procedure varied wildly and lacked a 
strict, institutionally based medical assessment, doctors and state medical boards sought to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood, California: University of California Press (1984), 4/14. 
24 Ibid., 20. 
25 Ibid., 44. 
26 Ibid., 45. 
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impose new regulations on doctors and hospitals. By the time that the Supreme Court decided 
Roe v. Wade in 1973, abortion was “no longer a technical, medical matter controlled by 
professionals, [but] emphatically a public and moral issue of nationwide concern.”27 The 
heightened public awareness of abortion and contraceptives presented a complicated political 
and religious dynamic in the years that followed. 
 
Conservative Religious Influence 
 What is important to understand, however, is that abortion was not originally the highly 
politicized issue that it is known to be today. In fact, originally Republicans supported a pro-
choice platform, and the GOP was the first major party to endorse the Equal Rights 
Amendment.28 In the 1940 Republican platform, the party wrote, “We favor submission by 
Congress to the States of an amendment to the Constitution providing for equal rights for men 
and women.”29 For the 1940s and 1950s, the Republican Party maintained a relatively liberal 
ideology with respect to women’s equal rights. As time progressed and women became more 
vocal in their support for equal rights, the conversation began to include issues concerning 
contraceptives and abortion. As a result, Republican support for women’s equal rights came to 
include support for reproductive rights. Since contraceptives and abortion were highly 
contentious issues at the time, support for either reflected a complicated choice for the 
Republican Party in its efforts to keep its voting constituency.  
 In fact, the grassroots and feminist movements of the 1960s gave rise to the formation of 
a new Republican electoral strategy. As mentioned previously, many feminists began to view 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Luker, 127.  
28 Daniel K. Williams, “The GOP’s Abortion Strategy: Why Pro-Choice Republicans Became Pro-Life in the 
1970s,” Journal of Policy History 23 no. 4 (2011): 514.   
29 “Republican Party Platform of 1940,” June 24, 1940,” The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29640. 
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challenging policies concerning childbearing as essential to women’s equality and advocated for 
the right to a legal abortion.30 The abortion issue became part of a much larger debate regarding 
women’s rights in general. As GOP researcher and journalist Robert N. Karrer explains, “the 
growth of the feminist movement and women’s rights contributed to the growing chasm that 
existed between traditional, family-oriented women and career-minded, liberal women.”31 Issues 
concerning family planning, contraceptives and abortion became central to the feminist 
movement’s rhetoric, and a large part of the policy debate involved religious objections to birth 
control and abortion. 
 In 1961, the National Council of Churches of Christ approved the use of birth control 
devices,32 which was received very well by most Christian religious groups. For example, 
Reverend James Pike, an Episcopal bishop, called family planning a “positive duty” for married 
couples that could not support a child.33 The Catholic Church, however, disagreed with the other 
denominations and expressed itself in several different ways, including letters to lay officials and 
members of the legislature, testimony before legislative committees, and speeches at events 
involving the city bishops.34 For example, in Connecticut where Planned Parenthood challenged 
a state law banning contraceptive use, Catholic legislators equated the use of birth control to 
abortion. They argued that the law could be a step towards legalizing abortion and explained, 
“we are not trying to impose our religious views on others, but we feel the use of the sex function 
solely for pleasure [and not for procreation]… is an unnatural practice.”35 While the Catholic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Linda Greenhouse and Reva B. Siegel, Before Roe v. Wade: Voices that shaped the abortion debate before the 
Supreme Court’s ruling (New Haven: Yale Law Library, 2012), 276.  
31 Robert N. Karrer, “The Pro-Life Movement and Its First Years under Roe,” American Catholic Studies 122 no. 4 
(2011): 50.   
32 N.E.H Hull and Peter Charles Hoffer, Roe v. Wade: The Abortion Rights Controversy in American History 
(Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 76.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid.   
35 Ibid., 77.  
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opposition to birth control succeeded in making the discussion of abortion more public, it did not 
fundamentally change the platform of the Republican party, or other denominations’ positions on 
birth control and abortion.   
 In fact, many Republicans supported the liberalization of state abortion laws. Another 
scholar of the Republican voting strategy, Daniel K. Williams, explains that Republicans 
believed that abortion law reform fit well with the party’s traditional support for birth control, 
middle-class morality, and Protestant values.36 At this time in the 1960s, Protestant churches 
were also in favor of the liberalization of state abortion laws, and accepted birth control and the 
idea of a “planned” family.37 In 1967, the Episcopal General Convention declared support for,  
 
The "termination of pregnancy" particularly in those cases where "the physical or 
mental health of the mother is threatened seriously, or where there is substantial 
reason to believe that the child would be born badly deformed in mind or body, or 
where the pregnancy has resulted from rape or incest”…Termination of 
pregnancy for these reasons is permissible.38 
 
 
This religious support continued into the next decade, as the Episcopal Church went on to 
acknowledge state laws related to abortion: “the Episcopal Church express[es] its unequivocal 
opposition to any legislation on the part of the national or state governments which would 
abridge or deny the right of individuals to reach informed decisions in this matter and to act upon 
them.”39 Additionally, the Presbyterian Church noted in its 1970 General Assembly, “when for 
misinformation, miscalculation, technical failure, or other reasons, contraception fails and an 
unwanted pregnancy is established, we do not think it either compassionate or just to insist that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Williams, “The GOP’s Abortion Strategy: Why Pro-Choice Republicans Became Pro-Life in the 1970s,” 515. 
37 Ibid.  
38 General Convention, Journal of the General Convention of...The Episcopal Church, Minneapolis, 1976 (New 
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available help be withheld."40 The Southern Baptist Church also recognized abortion legislation 
at the start of the 1970s,  
 
This Convention expresses the belief that society has a responsibility to affirm 
through the laws of the state a high view of the sanctity of human life, including 
fetal life, in order to protect those who cannot protect themselves… we call upon 
Southern Baptists to work for legislation that will allow the possibility of abortion 
under such conditions as rape, incest, clear evidence of severe fetal deformity, and 
carefully ascertained evidence of the likelihood of damage to the emotional, 
mental, and physical health of the mother.41 
 
That being said, Protestants were not the leaders of the pro-life debate in its early political stages. 
Since opposition to contraceptives and abortion was primarily a Catholic concern, and two-thirds 
of Catholics at the time were Democrats, opposition to women’s reproductive rights was not a 
main concern for the predominantly Protestant Republicans.42   
 It was not until the Catholic Church increased its vocal opposition to abortion that the 
Republican Party changed its position. One of the main religious groups opposed to abortion was 
the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB), which in 1970 released its Declaration on 
Abortion. The NCCB said:  
 
We remind Catholic physicians and nurses that regardless of changing laws, direct 
abortion is always morally wrong… Society should do all that is possible to 
provide necessary medical and other assistance. We urge government and all 
voluntary agencies…to intensify and broaden counseling and care for expectant 
mothers who otherwise may be tempted to resort to solutions contrary to God’s 
law.43  
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At this point, the Catholic Church was successfully bringing the discussion of birth control, 
abortion and women’s rights to the forefront of political debate. In doing so, they succeeded in 
denouncing the liberal platform of the Republican Party, especially surrounding the Equal Rights 
Amendment.  
 The Catholic Church reiterated socially conservative, family oriented values as a way to 
clarify its opposition to abortion and unhampered sexual liberty. As a result, the Republican 
Party began to respond to the Catholics’ remarks.  As Williams points out,  
 
Even if the White House viewed abortion primarily as a “Catholic issue,” there 
were also signs that it had broader appeal among a larger contingent of social 
conservatives who perhaps had been amenable to abortion law liberalization at 
one time, but who were turning against the idea because of their opposition to 
feminism and the sexual revolution.44 
 
Public awareness of abortion, feminism and the sexual revolution in the 1970s spurred a broader 
anti-abortion movement. The early stages of the anti-abortion movement were comprised 
predominantly of women homemakers.45 These were socially conservative women who had no 
previous experience in political activities, but who saw the possibility of legalized abortion as 
threatening. They were women who had experienced pregnancy first hand, and their personal 
values were centered on these experiences.46 Many were “far right Republicans and Protestant 
fundamentalists…For [these] women, the rallying cause was defeating the Equal Rights 
Amendment. They viewed the ERA as undermining women's God-given traditional role and, 
with it, an idealized nuclear family.”47 They believed that the ERA and the easy access to birth 
control and abortion would be detrimental to families. One of the group’s main leaders, Phyllis 	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Schlafly, explained in a 1979 speech that to function effectively in the family, a woman must 
believe her role as wife and mother is “worthy, honorable, useful and fulfilling.”48 Women like 
Phyllis Schlafly reframed the issue of birth control and abortion from a more socially 
conservative perspective. This, coupled with the continued opposition on behalf of the NCCB to 
women’s sexual freedom and reproductive rights, led to a prevalent shift in the Republican 
Party’s religious constituency. 
 Protestants who had previously supported the liberalization of abortion began to view the 
issue with apprehension. To use William’s words, “they were convinced that the nation was on a 
path to secularism.”49 They began to align themselves more closely with the views of the 
Catholic Church. For example, the Episcopal Church, which had previously submitted statements 
in support of abortion in the 1960s, passed a resolution in 1988 stating: "All human life is 
sacred.... We regard all abortion as having a tragic dimension, calling for the concern and 
compassion of all the Christian community…We emphatically oppose abortion as a means of 
birth control, family planning, sex selection, or any reason of mere convenience."50 This 
reflected a swift change in the Protestant stance on abortion and reproductive rights. For the 
Republican Party, which had relied upon the Protestant vote in presidential elections, the loss of 
Protestant support was significant. In 1972, the year before Roe v. Wade legalized abortion, the 
Republican party received 68.8% of the Protestant vote for president.51 As Catholics and 
Protestants began to put aside their previous differences in order to unite in political coalitions 
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against aspects of the sexual revolution, it became more apparent to Republicans that abortion 
could function as an electoral tool to capture new Christian votes. Conscious of the large 
Catholic and Protestant voting blocs that stood to be won over, Republican politicians adopted a 
conservative, pro-family oriented ideology that would bring abortion to the political stage and 
transform the Republican electoral strategy. 
The Nixon Campaign 
 Emphasizing socially conservative values in order to win the Catholic voting bloc first 
took hold as a strategy in the Republican Party with Richard Nixon in 1969. By the late 1960s, 
Southern Democrats and Catholics, given their strong opposition to abortion and contraceptives, 
had been identified as target groups whom Republicans might persuade to shift party 
affiliation.52 The Nixon campaign relied heavily on a book written by Kevin Phillips, The 
Emerging Republican Majority, which argued that social issues were producing a political 
realignment that would benefit Republicans. The Emerging Republican Majority does not 
directly identify the abortion issue as a means of attracting the Catholic vote, but as women’s 
rights researchers Linda Greenhouse and Reva Siegel point out, Phillips famously advised the 
Republican Party to recruit blocs of voters traditionally affiliated with the Democratic Party, 
including Southerners “who were estranged from the party’s civil rights agenda.” 53 Soon after 
the book was published, Republican campaign strategists began to experiment with its advice. 
For example, Harry Dent, the man in charge of Nixon’s campaign operations in the south, told 
the President that “Midwestern Catholics would be just as vital as southerners in the President’s 
reelection calculations,”54 and urged Nixon to “find a way to bring conservative Catholics into 	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the Republican camp by adopting a moderately conservative policy.”55 Nixon had only won 33 
percent of the Catholic vote in the presidential election of 1968,56 so he resolved to try Dent’s 
recommendations and appeal to Catholics through a socially conservative agenda during his 
presidency. In an odd juxtaposition, Nixon began his presidency with an expansion of the federal 
government’s family-planning initiatives, only to later abandon the premise of the initiatives in 
favor of a belief in the “sanctity of life.”57 It is clear that Nixon’s shift in ideology during the 
reelection campaign was not because of a change in his fundamental values or religious beliefs, 
but rather was a result of the advice of the President’s conservative election strategists, which he 
accepted. As the reelection campaign approached, strategists understood Nixon’s need to win the 
conservative Catholic vote and pushed for a socially conservative, anti-abortion campaign 
message. 
 In April of 1971, for example, Nixon emphasized conservative morals in his statement on 
a new policy that required military hospitals to conform to state laws; “From personal and 
religious beliefs I consider abortion an unacceptable form of population control. Further, 
unrestricted abortion policies, or abortion on demand, I cannot square with my personal belief in 
the sanctity of human life--including the life of the yet unborn.”58 He was advised to emphasize 
his religious beliefs by campaign operative Charles Colson, who on the issue of military 
abortions, told a fellow operative, “I hope to hell that any of our spokesmen who are out talking 
about this make it very clear the President is against abortion.”59 The strategy was successful, 
and well received by Catholics. For example, James T. McHugh of the Family Life Division of 
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the U.S. Catholic Conference issued an official commendation of the presidents directive: 
“President Nixon has been forthright and courageous in stating his opposition to abortion on 
demand.”60 The support of the Catholic Church gave the “Christian Strategy” that campaign 
operatives were pressing on Nixon a new sense of legitimacy. He even agreed to sign a letter 
drafted by his speech writer, Pat Buchanan, that was sent to New York’s Terence Cardinal 
Cooke, in which he applauded Catholics’ “noble endeavor” to “act as defenders of the right to 
life of the unborn.”61 This is important, because he decided to inform influential members of the 
Catholic Church of his abortion position. As the election campaign continued, he managed to 
successfully establish himself as the more conservative candidate and was able to defeat George 
McGovern in the reelection campaign with 60.5% of the Catholic vote, becoming the first 
Republican presidential candidate to win the Catholic majority.62 
 It is important to understand that the fundamental change to the Republican platform on 
abortion was a result of the work of religiously committed activists. It is worth noting that when 
Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973, the decision did not command significant attention from 
politicians, but rather from pro-life religious grassroots organizations. Alliances between varying 
religious institutions became a key component of the pro-life movement’s success. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that the pro-life movement was originally a creation of the Family Life division 
of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB). The NCCB collaborated with pro-life 
organizations, most predominantly the National Right to Life Commission (NRLC) to launch a 
legal and educationally based opposition campaign.63 For example, in 1975, the NCCB presented 
a detailed strategy for the church’s antiabortion crusade, called the “Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life 	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Activity.”64 The strategy called for a network of “prolife committees” based in the parishes that 
would do the following: effect the passage of a “prolife amendment,” elect pro-life sympathizers 
to local party organizations, monitor officials on their abortion stands, and work for qualified 
candidates who would vote for a constitutional amendment and other prolife issues.65 From the 
outset, as abortion scholar Rosalind Petchesky explains, “the [pro-life] movement was set up to 
be a political action machine to influence national and local elections.”66 The strength found in 
the collaboration between prolife organizations and religious institutions would play a crucial 
role in the upcoming 1976 election. 
 
The Reagan Era 
 As mentioned earlier, the unified stance of Catholics and Evangelicals had built a strong 
pro-life framework. For Republicans, it was becoming increasingly clear that in order to win the 
large block of Christian voters, candidates would have to articulate a conservative, pro-life 
position. In other words, the Republican platform did not shift towards a conservative, anti-
abortion framework merely because of a shift in ideology within the party, but more so because 
of the need to gain votes. In the elections of 1976 and 1980, the Republican Party saw most 
clearly and profoundly the consequences of failing to adopt a pro-life stance. Southern Baptist 
Jimmy Carter, for example, was chosen by pro-life activists as the candidate likely to favor their 
cause. During his 1976 presidential campaign, Carter promised social conservatives that, if 
elected, he would convene a conference to examine how the federal government could support 
American families. In the words of religion scholar Seth Dowland, “That promise, coupled with 	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his description of being a “born again,” devout Christian thrilled American evangelicals, 
providing him a crucial bloc of support in the election”.67  
 Once elected, Carter stuck to his promise and convened a Conference that would examine 
the “traditional” American family. Announcing his Conference in January of 1978, he declared, 
“the main purpose of this White House Conference will be to examine the strengths of American 
families, the difficulties they face, and the ways in which family life is affected by public 
policies.”68 Although Carter did not directly address the issue of abortion in the Conference, he 
emphasized traditional family values as a means to gaining Catholic and Evangelical support. 
The problem, however, was that the members involved with the Conference insisted on 
examining the pressures facing homosexual and single-parent families, refusing to define a 
family as a heterosexual, two-parent household.69 This was troublesome, since Catholics and 
Evangelicals now were committed to the defense of the “traditional family” and were opposed to 
abortion, feminism and gay rights.70 For Christian activists, their faith based belief in the 
“traditional family” shaped their political strategy for opposing abortion, and the goals of 
President’s Conference were contrary to that. What President Carter had hoped to be a successful 
reevaluation of the definition of “family” resulted in immense conservative and religious 
backlash. With the failed reputation of the Conference, Carter lost the electoral support of 
conservative Catholic and Evangelicals. This alienated a large bloc of pro-life Christian voters, 
leaving them to be swept up by the next presidential candidate willing to support their cause.  
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  Ronald Reagan capitalized on the opportunity to gain Catholic and Evangelical votes by 
meeting with pro-life activists before the 1980 New Hampshire presidential primary, advocating 
a Constitutional amendment that would ban all abortions except those necessary to save the life 
of the mother.71 His support for the amendment reflected the pro-life ideology of the Catholic 
Church, but puzzled many observers; “After all, could a non-churchgoing, divorced former 
Hollywood actor who had signed an abortion liberalization bill in California and had refused to 
back an anti-gay- rights referendum in his state really have been sincere in his endorsement of 
the Christian Right?”72 Regardless of his shaky reputation as a Catholic and Evangelical 
supporter, Reagan’s belief in a religiously based moral order resonated with the views of the 
Christian Right, especially Evangelicals and Catholics. For example, in the 1980 presidential 
debate in Baltimore against John Anderson, Reagan said,  
 
I think all of us should have a respect for innocent life. With regard to the 
freedom of the individual for choice, with regard to abortion, there's one 
individual who's not being considered at all. That's the one who is being aborted. 
And I've noticed that everybody that is for abortion has already been born.73 
  
 
Establishing his clear opposition to abortion, Regan included a pro-life narrative in his speeches 
during the campaign in an attempt to appeal to conservative Christian voters. As part of the 
National Affairs Briefing in Dallas, Reagan spoke before 15,000 conservative Christians. With 
all of the statements on abortion and contraceptives that have been publicized since the years of 
Nixon and Carter, his words reflected most clearly the Republican strategy to win over the 
Catholic and Evangelical vote, 
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Religious America is awakening, perhaps just in time for our country's sake. If we 
believe God has blessed America with liberty, then we have not just a right to 
vote but a duty to vote... If you do not speak your mind and cast your ballot, then 
who will speak and work for the ideals we cherish? Who will vote to protect the 
American family and respect its interests in the formulation of public policy? I 
know you can't endorse me because this is a nonpartisan crowd, but I ... want you 
to know that I endorse you and what you are doing.74 
 
 
By reaffirming his commitment to the conservative values, Reagan solidified a relationship 
between the Republican Party, Catholics, and Evangelicals.  
 Following the National Affairs Briefing, the Southern Baptist Convention released a 
statement in the Baptist Press that summarized his speech and noted his promise to appoint 
Christians to the Administration if elected.75 Although the Southern Baptist Convention did not 
formally endorse Reagan, it was clear that his promise to appoint Christians to the 
Administration played a significant role in winning the Evangelical vote. Southern Baptist Ed 
McAteer, a participant in the roundtable discussions during the National Affairs briefing, said, 
“My feeling is that [Reagan] is in sympathy with what we are in sympathy with."76 Increased 
public discussion of and press attention to Reagan’s conservative ideology reflected a growing 
support for the presidential candidate among conservative Christians. Delighted by the fact that 
Reagan supported their positions on contraceptives and abortion and was willing to incorporate 
those opinions into the Republican Platform, conservative Evangelical activists quickly focused 
their efforts on supporting the Reagan campaign.77 In the election, he won 53.7% of the 
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Protestant vote, as well as 54.5% of the Catholic vote.78 Reagan’s decision to commit to the 
faith-based ideology of conservative Christians with respect to reproductive rights reshaped the 
Republican Party’s ideology in the American political debate. 
 
A New Conservative Platform   
 By the end of the 1980s, Conservative Catholics and Evangelicals had gained control of 
the GOP, making it virtually impossible for a Republican to win the presidential nomination 
without supporting the pro-life movement. The conservative pro-life organizations, under the 
influence of religious groups like the NCCB, “bolstered the party’s pro-life stance, ensuring that 
the issue would remain a central consideration in Supreme Court nominations and national 
elections.”79 The fusing of religious institutions and pro-life activist groups transformed the 
Republican Party ideology. The 1980 Republican platform officially signified a position that 
aligned with the conservative Christian doctrine. Under a separate, specific plank labeled 
“Abortion”, it read,  
 
We reaffirm our belief in the traditional roles and values of the family in our 
society. The damage being done today to the family takes its greatest toll on the 
woman…the importance of support for the mother and homemaker in maintaining 
the values of this country cannot be over-emphasized.80 
  
 
Since the national Republican Party had realigned itself with a stringent conservative position on 
reproductive rights, an entirely new set of obstacles in approaching the abortion issue were 
created. The newly adopted platform for the Republican Party was in large part developed 	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because of religious influence. Moreover, the Party’s official position against abortion had 
become the symbol for a culturally conservative movement that was more powerful than 
Republican Party leaders themselves, “even the ones who had created the party platform 
statement were unable to reverse it.”81 Today, as a result of these changes in the Republican 
Party orientation, a majority of Catholics who attend church weekly vote Republican in 
presidential elections, as well as more than 70 percent of white evangelicals.82 By 2009, only 26 
percent of Republicans were pro-choice.83  
 Predictably, the decline in the number of pro-choice Republicans corresponds to an 
increase in pro-life legislation. The nationwide influx of new legislation in the past 30 years 
reflects a new strategy aimed at restricting women’s access to abortion and contraceptives. Most 
recently, especially since 2005, Republicans have supported new laws that focus on access to 
abortion rather than the actual “right to choose.” Moreover, they reflect a shift away from the 
original concerns that Republicans expressed regarding abortion as “anti-family” and “non-
traditional.” Instead, the new laws target the abortion provider and the facility in which the 
procedure is performed. These are known as TRAP laws, or the Targeted Regulation of Abortion 
Providers. These laws are controversial because they focus on whether or not the facility or 
physician providing the abortion is safe, rather than the conditions under which a woman may 
choose to terminate a pregnancy. The abortion debate has been reshaped to focus instead on 
safety and public health concerns, but it is problematic because of the people who are making the 
health claims, namely conservative, pro-life Republicans.  
 Given the fact that the main proponents of these laws are in fact the socially conservative, 
pro-life Republican legislators, the Christian Right has helped shape the new laws to achieve its 	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objectives. As the next chapters will show, the enactment of TRAP laws is in large part due to 
the advocacy of conservative pro-life organizations that have designed model legislation for 
restricting abortion. By targeting pro-life legislators, the conservative organizations have 
successfully circulated the model laws into the state legislative sessions. Due to the fundamental 
realignment of the Republican Party in the 1980s, organizations are able to appeal to the party 
platform and pass laws that, once enacted, will reflect the party’s principal goal: to limit access 
to abortion, and, ultimately, overturn Roe. The implications of these laws make it necessary to 
examine the TRAP movement more closely.  
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Chapter 2: What is a TRAP law? 
 
“One of the most exciting things is looking back at where we were in 2008, when there 
was such desperation in the pro-life movement, and comparing it to now, when we are 
seeing a tidal wave of pro-life victories” – Charmaine Yoest, President and CEO of 
Americans United for Life.84 
 
 
 In political debate since 2000, Christian Right efforts have been characterized by its 
opponents as constituting a “war on women.” Democratic politicians have utilized the expression 
to describe certain Republican Party policies as a wide-scale effort to restrict women’s rights, 
especially those related to reproduction.85 In a recent article published by RH Reality Check, 
journalist Zerlina Maxwell uses the words of Rand Paul to characterize Republican sentiment 
regarding abortion and reproductive rights. She writes that when asked about the “war on 
women,” Rand Paul said,  
 
Well, you know, I think we have a lot of debates in Washington that get dumbed 
down and are used for political purposes. This whole sort of ‘war on women’ 
thing, I’m scratching my head because if there was a ‘war on women,’ I think 
they won. You know, the women in my family are incredibly successful.86 
 
 
Although Rand Paul’s logic seems to make sense, since women have continued to gain 
equivalent success in the workforce in the past 30 years, the same success does not hold true for 
reproductive rights. As Maxwell explains, “there may not be a “war on women” in the traditional 
sense, but there is, however, an all-out and persistent assault on women’s bodies, choices, 
equality, freedom, and rights.”87  
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 Much of this is attributable to the state level restrictive legislation aimed at abortion since 
2005. The new legislation that has been pushed forward has “stripped away much of the feminist 
progress of the past generation.”88 This legislative aim is most notable with TRAP laws, which 
target abortion providers with burdensome, unnecessary laws. There are three main categories of 
TRAP laws. The first requires abortions facilities to meet special licensing requirements and 
subjects clinics to “surprise” inspections. The second kind requires all abortion clinics to meet 
the same structural and regulatory standards as ambulatory surgical centers, regardless of the 
types of abortions performed at the facility. And the third type requires doctors who perform 
abortions in the state to enter into special agreements with local hospitals, in the form of transfer 
arrangements or admitting privileges.89 TRAP laws have been advanced in state legislatures by 
conservative, pro-life members in states with conservative, pro-life governments. The 
requirements aimed at the provider are problematic because even though they do not directly 
impact the women’s right to choose, they nevertheless limit access to abortion. This is a 
coordinated effort, and although it may not be an all out war against women, it interferes with the 
freedom of the woman to make her own choices, as Roe guarantees. It is for this reason that pro-
choice advocates contend that these policies constitute a war against reproductive rights.  
 This chapter will trace the emergence of TRAP laws since the end of the 1990s, and the 
effect that the laws have had on restricting abortion. It will examine the new incremental 
legislative approach that conservative policymakers have adopted, as well as the influence of 
conservative pro-life organizations in promoting the laws. A close assessment of the TRAP law 
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strategy will help to reveal how this type of restrictive legislation differs from previous 
approaches to limiting access to abortion.  
 
A New Approach 
 In 1992, the Supreme Court decided Planned Parenthood v. Casey,90 upholding several 
different provisions that restricted access to abortion, including parental consent, a 24 hour 
waiting period, and informed consent. The Court reaffirmed the right to abortion, but created a 
new “undue burden” standard to determine whether a law was constitutional. An undue burden 
exists if the purpose or effect of a provision places substantial obstacles in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. This meant that states could require 
provisions restricting access to abortion, so long as the regulations did not place an “undue 
burden” on a woman’s ability to obtain the procedure. Pro-life advocates began to revise their 
strategy. Instead of focusing on provisions that curtailed or constrained an individual pregnant 
woman’s decision, like waiting periods and parental consent, they would focus on laws that 
regulated the abortion procedure and could be justified as health regulations.91 As Dorinda 
Bordlee, staff counsel for the conservative Americans United for Life organization, explained:  
 
The Casey decision started abortion opponents rethinking their tactics. Since 
direct assaults on Roe wouldn't fly, there had to be a shift in strategy by regulation 
on the outskirts of abortion... By claiming that abortions take place in dirty 
facilities and cause such illnesses as depression and breast cancer, right-to-lifers 
realized they could subtly move the focus of the debate.92 
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With legal approaches aimed at overturning Roe in the courts seemingly at a standstill, pro-life 
strategists undertook an incremental approach that chips away at abortion indirectly. In the 
United States Congress, the move to apply incremental legislative efforts in the past 20 years has 
been quite clear. This is in large part because of the fact that the legislation proposes less of a 
sweeping change, and is easier to pass: “Incremental legislation has the advantage of being 
minor. Small or minor moves may not seem like an advantage, but small policy moves are less 
prone to counteractive lobbying by opposition advocates.”93 As seen in the table below, 
Congress has increasingly proposed legislation that utilizes the incremental strategy; 31% of 
incremental proposals were made in the 1970s and 1980s, as compared to 87% in the mid 1990s 
and early 2000s. 
 
Incremental and Non-Incremental Abortion Proposals in the U.S. Congress94 
Congress/Year Incremental Nonincremental 	   Total	  
93-98 (1973-1984) 137 (31%) 308 (70%) 	   445 
99-102 (1985-1992) 163 (77%) 50 (24%) 	   213 
103-108 (1993-2004) 303 (87%) 45 (13%) 	   348 
                   
The incremental proposals have had dangerous implications; in the 95th Congress for example, 
House Joint Resolution 5 would have extended due process and equal protection to the individual 
from the moment of conception, and House Joint Resolution 133 would have prohibited 
abortions after the fetus’ heart began to beat.95 Looking at the progression of incremental 
proposals in the U.S. Congress, it is not surprising that the same trend has emerged in state 
legislatures. With a gridlock on abortion policy in Congress, it is more difficult to enact 
legislation at the federal level. Therefore, pro-life state legislators who favor restrictive abortion 	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legislation have the best opportunity to enact new laws. As legislative correspondent Abby Scher 
explains, “With the Beltway divided between the anti-choice house and the pro-choice Senate, 
and the U.S. Supreme Court still pro-choice, the states are where most of the action is right now 
for anti-abortion groups.”96 The move to enact restrictive provisions at the state level has been 
gaining traction since the 1990s, and opponents recently have stepped up their efforts to block 
clinics from providing abortions.97 The growing effectiveness of applying restrictions to abortion 
clinics and physicians’ offices has led to an influx in the past decade of laws that apply states’ 
standards for ambulatory surgical centers to abortion clinics, include requirements for the 
physical plant, such as room size and corridor width, and require that facilities maintain 
relationships with hospitals.”98 As a result, TRAP requirements are now in place in 27 states, 
where 60% of women of reproductive age live.99 In the graphics below, it is clear that a pattern 
seems to exist between anti-choice state governments and restrictive laws aimed at requiring 
ambulatory surgical centers or hospital admitting privileges.  
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States with Anti-Choice Governments (represented in red)100 
 
 
States with Structural Standards Equivalent to those for 
Surgical Centers (represented in red)101 
 
 
States that Require the Clinic to have Hospital Privileges  
or an Alternative Agreement (represented in red)102 
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Model Legislation 
 
 The pro-life leadership recognized that the piecemeal, incremental approach to 
permanently overturning Roe was becoming widely accepted as a more effective means to 
restricting abortion. For American’s United for Life (AUL), an active pro-life organization since 
1971, the overarching maxim was that, “when a complete and immediate prohibition is not 
possible, enact prudential limits to contain the social evil as a means to ultimately eliminating 
it.”103 Adopting a policy of incrementalism, the pro-life activists found a strategy that effectively 
sidestepped the roadblocks faced with the previous, more direct approach.  It was a successful 
strategy because it did not focus directly on a woman’s right to choose to terminate a pregnancy, 
and therefore avoided the rights claims imposed in the federal courts. Essentially, AUL reframed 
the abortion debate in terms of the health threats that the procedure posed for women. AUL 
President Charmaine Yoest confirmed this:  
 
Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has turned away from the threat that abortion 
poses for the baby, because the Supreme Court has said repeatedly they’re 
concerned about the woman. So we basically want to say to the court, “we share 
your concern for women. You need to look at the fact that abortion itself harms 
women.”104  
 
 
Her words verify the main goal of pro-life activists, namely to overturn Roe. Moreover, by 
focusing on rhetoric that abortion itself harms women and by reframing the abortion issue as a 
public health and safety matter, AUL has helped legislatures write laws that have forced several 
abortion providers to shut down, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters.  
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 The pro-life activists are clear about their embrace of this indirect, incremental strategy. 
In its booklet of model restrictive abortion legislation, Defending Life, AUL includes the words 
of 19th century philosopher Kierkegaard to support its legislative strategy,  
 
An illusion can never be destroyed directly, and only by indirect means can it be 
radically removed…That is, one must approach from behind the person who is 
under an illusion…A direct attack only strengthens a person in his illusion, and, at 
the same time, embitters him…the indirect method, which, loving and serving the 
truth, arranges everything dialectically for the prospective captive.105 
 
This speaks directly to the fact that AUL has deliberately sought to enact manipulative, 
misleading legislation. This is especially significant for understanding why a flood of TRAP 
laws has recently been enacted. The restrictions aimed at abortion providers and abortion clinics 
can successfully bypass the legal limitations in the federal courts, allowing for a nearly seamless 
incremental approach to their enactment. On March of 2014, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled on a Texas law that required abortion providers to obtain hospital-admitting privileges, 
holding it to be constitutional.106 In April of 2014, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals will also 
hear oral arguments for an admitting privileges requirement in Mississippi,107 likely to result in a 
similar ruling. In several cases, the restrictive laws have not even faced legal challenges. In 
March of 2014, for example, a settlement was reached for a lawsuit that challenged a North 
Dakota admitting privileges requirement, keeping the requirement in place.108 As laws continue 
to be enacted nationwide, it will be crucial to track the ways in which the legislation is being 
challenged in the courts.  	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 Leading the incremental strategy is AUL, which, in an effort to eliminate abortion 
through the regulation of abortion clinics, has designed model legislation for Republican 
legislatures to adopt. AUL developed both the “Abortion Patients’ Enhanced Safety Act,” which 
imposes ambulatory surgical standards on abortion clinics, and the “Women’s Health Protection 
Act,” which mandates that abortion clinics meet national abortion care standards.109 The 
development of such model legislation is explained as a necessary component to assist the states 
in combating “back alley abortions” where abortion procedures are performed in unsanitary 
clinics under the slipshod direction of the physicians. AUL also recommends to states the AUL 
model clinic regulations and “Abortion Providers’ Privileging Act,” that would limit the 
performance of abortions to properly licensed physicians and mandate that abortion providers 
have hospital admitting privileges that are “critical to ensuring that women receive proper and 
competent abortion care.”110 Examples of the AUL model legislation can be seen in the appendix 
section of this thesis.   
 Within the model legislation, AUL meticulously outlines and emphasizes the health risks 
that women face because of the lack of clinic and provider restrictions. The “Abortion Providers’ 
Privileging Act,” for example, relies upon previous court doctrine to push forward its 
conservative agenda. The drafted legislation describes the state as having “legitimate interests 
from the outset of pregnancy in protecting the health of women,” (Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey), “legitimate concern with the health of women who undergo abortions” (Akron v. Akron 
Ctr.), “legitimate concern for the publics health and safety” (Williamson v. Lee Optical), and 
“legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed 
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under circumstances that ensure maximum safety for the patient” (Roe v. Wade).111  With a 
disguised concern for women’s health, AUL pushes the model legislation as a means to 
effectively curb “unsafe abortions.” What cannot be forgotten, however, is the underlying effort 
of the pro-life movement to create an illusion.  
 The model legislation neglects to mention the fact that abortion procedures are already 
regulated, and that all health care facilities, including abortion providers, are required to comply 
with federal and state regulations, including the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments 
(CLIA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration requirements (OSHA).112 In fact, 
abortion is one of the safest and most commonly provided procedures in the United States, and 
less than 0.3% of abortion patients experience a complication requiring hospitalization.113 Given 
that 90% of all abortions take place in outpatient facilities such as doctors’ offices and clinics, 
the reality of such model legislation is not actually a safer environment for women. The true goal 
is the elimination of abortion clinics and as a result, the reduction in access to abortion and other 
reproductive health services. Several pro-life advocates have candidly admitted this. For example 
Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant, said of the state’s only abortion clinic being subject to closure 
because of strict admitting privileges requirements, “my goal of course is to shut it down.”114 
Yet, despite such blatant disregard for women’s health and safety, the restrictive laws continue to 
be enacted.  
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Emerging Restrictive Laws 
 In the past decade, from 2000-2011, the United States experienced a dramatic increase in 
the number of states with restrictive abortion laws. A 2012 Guttmacher Institute report revealed 
that the number of anti-choice provisions that have been enacted has increased significantly since 
1985. This information is represented by the graphic below. The Guttmacher report found that a 
number of states shifted from having only a moderate number of abortion restrictions to several 
substantial ones.115 This evidence demonstrates the success of the new conservative strategy 
aimed at restricting access to abortion nationwide.       
 
Number of Abortion Restrictions Enacted, 1985-2011116      
 
              
 
Although the data represented includes all types of restrictive provisions; and not just TRAP 
laws, it is important to note the significance with which the incremental strategy has been 
successfully adopted. Especially considering that TRAP laws began to gain traction in 2000, it is 	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likely that the laws aimed at abortion providers contributed to the increasing trend in anti-choice 
measures since then.  
 In 2005 alone, twenty-one state legislators considered TRAP bills.117 In the February 2014 
policy briefing for TRAP laws, Guttmacher reported that 25 states require facilities where 
abortion services are provided to meet standards intended for ambulatory surgical centers, 
including provisions requiring specific sizes to procedure rooms, specific corridor widths, a set 
distance from a hospital, and a transfer agreement with a nearby hospital. Additionally, 13 states 
require abortion providers to have some affiliation with a local hospital, including admitting 
privileges or specific board certifications.118 To reiterate, these laws are burdensome and 
unnecessary, and place strict regulations on hospitals and providers of abortions that do not apply 
to other medical professionals. 
 In order to assess how the volume of abortion restrictions had changed since 2000, the 
Guttmacher report compared restrictions in 2000, 2005 and 2011. Labeling states as either 
“supportive,” “middle ground” or “hostile” to abortion, the report listed ten different categories 
for restrictive provisions.119 A state was considered supportive if it enacted a provision in no 
more than one of the categories; middle ground if it enacted two or three of the categories, and 
hostile if it enacted provisions in four or more of the categories.120 The increase in the number of 
provisions enacted since 2000 shows that anti-choice legislators utilized an increasing variety of 
provisions to restrict abortion access. The report found that in 2000, the U.S. was almost evenly 	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divided, with nearly a third of American women of reproductive age living in states solidly 
hostile to abortion rights, slightly more than a third in states supportive of abortion rights, and 
close to a third in middle ground states; a stark difference from 2011, however, when more than 
half of the women of reproductive age were living in hostile states.”121 Accompanying the 
increase in restrictive laws was the fact that abortion laws were increasingly targeted at 
providers, rather than at individual women seeking an abortion. Laws that included onerous 
requirements on abortion facilities, unrelated to patient safety, were some of the most prevalent 
in states that were considered to be “hostile.” 
 The report found that while the number of supportive states remained relatively consistent, 
the number of middle ground states decreased significantly, and the number of hostile states 
intensified. In 2000, 19 states were middle ground and only 13 were hostile. By 2011, 26 states 
were hostile to abortion rights, and the number of middle ground was nine.122 
 
Summary of Guttmacher Institute Data Representing States as Supportive, Middle  
Ground or Hostile towards Abortion123 
 2000 2005 2011 
Supportive 19 17 15 
Middle Ground 18 14 9 
Hostile 13 19 26 
               
In addition to the sharp change in numbers, it is noteworthy that the majority of the states that 
have shifted to a more hostile rating were those in the middle of country, including Idaho, 
Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska and South Dakota, all of which have anti-choice governors and state 
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legislatures.124 The fact that the dramatic shift in anti-abortion legislation in the past decade 
occurred predominantly in conservative, anti-choice run states, speaks to the significance of the 
emerging and successful conservative-led TRAP movement.  
 The breakdown of pro-life and pro-choice legislatures reveals an important connection 
between TRAP laws and conservative legislators. In state governments where the majority of the 
legislature and the governor share the same position on abortion, there are seven states with pro-
choice governments, as compared to 21 states with anti-choice governments.125 Considering that 
TRAP laws have been enacted as part of a conservative led legislative movement, the prevalence 
of anti-choice state governments is concerning. For example, of the 25 states in which facilities 
are required to meet certain ambulatory surgical center standards, all but 5 have anti-choice 
governments.126 As for the requirement that providers obtain hospital admitting privileges, all but 
one of the eight states that have enacted this measure have an anti-choice government.127  
 The impact of the TRAP laws that have been enacted is clear, since most of the laws have 
forced abortion providers to shut down. The number of U.S. abortion providers declined 4% 
between 2008 and 2011, while 12 clinics were forced to stop providing abortion services.128 In 
fact, 89% of all U.S. counties lacked an abortion clinic in 2011.129 An additional concern to the 
ongoing decline in both providers and clinics is the decline in states that are supportive of 
abortion rights, which has fallen from 17 to 13 since 2000.130 These data confirm the 
effectiveness of the TRAP law approach over the past decade in restricting access to abortion. 	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The reason that the approach has been so successful is because of the fact that organizations like 
AUL have spearheaded a legislative strategy through model legislation. According to the non 
profit news organization, Mother Jones, AUL can claim credit for 24 new restrictive laws that 
were passed in 2011.131 Americans United for Life and its legal team is the source of Defending 
Life, often called “the playbook” of pro-life legislation, providing a template for legislators who 
want to work to protect women’s health and the lives of the unborn.132 In reference to the 2013 
legislative session, AUL President, Youst, said, “Equipped with the best legal tools, state leaders 
are courageously putting the pro-life convictions of their constituents over the abortion lobby’s 
disingenuous and politically motivated pressure campaigns.”133 In fact, the 2013 AUL 
Legislative Session report provided several examples of cases in which states adopted the model 
legislation, labeling them as “AUL victories,”  
 
Alabama enacted a provision, inspired by AUL model language, requiring that 
abortion clinics meet the same medically appropriate standards of patient care as 
ambulatory surgical centers; AUL and its allies helped Texas enact a measure 
requiring individual abortion providers to have hospital admitting privileges; 
AUL provided legal and policy resources to 39 states, while AUL Action, through 
our state representatives and other allies, worked in 31 states to promote life-
affirming legislation and to defeat anti-life initiatives.134 
 
Although these are just a few examples of AUL’s specific involvement with restrictive abortion 
legislation, the trend is clear. In order to fully realize the impact of the litigation, and the 
profundity of the statistics that continue to emerge in its favor, the true intentions behind the 
TRAP law must be exposed.  	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Chapter 3: Admitting Privileges in Texas 
“To be clear, my goal, and the goal of many of those joining me here today, is to make 
abortion, at any stage, a thing of the past.” – Governor Rick Perry (TX)135 
 
 When the conservative pro-life organization, Americans United for Life (AUL) 
announced its 2014 rankings for the states that best protected women from what they called 
“abortion industry horrors,”136 Texas was named an All-Star. According to AUL president and 
CEO Charmaine Yoest, the All-Stars ranking is awarded to states based on the enactment of 
“protective, common-sense legislation” and “each of AUL’s 2014 All stars enacted life saving 
legislation to protect women from a dangerous procedure that is too often performed in 
substandard facilities.”137 The sweeping accusation aimed at the abortion industry was expected, 
coming from a longstanding conservative organization like AUL. The ranking however, although 
virtually meaningless outside of the sphere of pro-choice and pro-life activists, still suggests 
troubling implications. The All-Star ranking was released as a parallel component to AUL’s 
newest legislative push, the Women’s Protection Project. The project, launched in preparation 
for the 2014 legislative session, offered a set of model legislation that seeks to limit and overturn 
pro-choice legislation by highlighting abortion’s negative impact and the growing concern 
regarding health risks to women.138 Amplifying the pro-life message to a higher, more 
accusatory level, the project suggests a legitimate and serious concern for the health of women 
on behalf of social conservatives, putting pro-choice advocates on the defense while presenting 
the proposed model legislation as the only viable solution. AUL has succeeded in disseminating 
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this message in large part because of outreach to Republican legislators. For example, in an 
email to David Lifferth, a Republican in the Utah House of Representatives, Youst begins,  
 
Dear David, As you begin work on the 2014 state legislative session, Americans 
United for Life has launched the Women’s Protection Project to highlight 
abortion’s negative impact on women and to recommend specific legislative 
solutions to the growing concerns regarding the health risks to women caused by 
abortion. We encourage you to review the Women’s Protection Project booklet, 
evaluate AUL’s assessment of your state’s current legislative status, and consider 
any bills in this package relevant to your state as you consider enacting pro-life 
legislation this year.139  
 
 
By providing key legislators in strong pro-life states with a booklet full of model legislation, 
AUL is able to spread the pro-life message and reframe the debate in terms of women’s health 
and safety.  
 So, what does the All-Star label really mean? It is doubtful that the state legislators who 
are rewarded the arbitrary honor publically celebrate the achievement, or hang a plaque on their 
office wall to boast of the recognition. Yet despite such a trivial label, AUL has succeeded in 
generating state support and adoption of the model legislation. Texas Governor Rick Perry 
wrote, “AUL plays a key role in developing and promoting legislation in all 50 states, legislation 
crafted to minimize the damage done by the abortion industry and its proponents.”140 Given the 
government support, it is clear that AUL and Governor Perry share the same position on 
abortion, and it is for this reason that conservative, pro-life states have succeeded in enacting 
restrictive pro-life legislation. By looking at the 2013 Texas House Bill, House Bill 2, and its 
close ties to AUL, it becomes clear how the conservative pro-life strategy does not actually 
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further the goal of making women’s reproductive health services safer, despite claims to the 
contrary.  
 This chapter will address the recent decline in abortion providers in Texas. It will look 
closely at the legislative process for Texas House Bill 2, and determine how AUL model 
legislation played a role in the law’s enactment. Lastly, it will examine the legal arguments made 
in court when the law was challenged and determine whether the law has, as pro-life legislators 
claimed, improved Texas women’s reproductive health and safety.  
 
Abortion in Texas 
 Finding new and more powerful ways to limit access to abortion, Texas has made 
women’s reproductive health services in the state less accessible by adopting legislation that 
requires abortion physicians to have hospital admitting privileges. This is a stringent requirement 
that led to the closing of nine clinics in the first six months since the law’s enactment.141 
 Since the years of Roe, the abortion issue in Texas remains a contentious and highly 
politicized topic. Currently, the state requires that a woman receive state directed counseling, 
parental consent if she is a minor, and a mandatory ultrasound in which the provider shows and 
describes the image to her before the procedure. She also is required to wait 24 hours before 
obtaining an abortion, and cannot obtain public funding unless the abortion is the cause of life 
endangerment, rape or incest.142 Most recently, however, Texas has enacted laws that are focused 
on requirements that a women must meet prior to the procedure, but that instead restrict the 
abortion provider. This recent shift towards targeting the provider is reflected in the stark decline 
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in abortions over the past decade. In 2010, there were 5,689,320 women of reproductive age 
(aged 13-44) in Texas, among which 505,220 (aged 20-44) were below 100% of the federal 
poverty level.143 In 2000, there were 89,160 women who had obtained abortions in Texas, 
compared to 73,200 in 2011.144 Although the information is based on abortions for women who 
are both residents of Texas and those living out of state, it is clear that access to abortion in the 
state has become progressively more limited. Despite being the second most populous state, 
Texas only represents 6.9% of all abortions in the United States.145 The graph below shows the 
clear decline in abortion incidence since the 1980s, with an especially sharp decline since 2008.  
 
 
           146 
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The abortion rate has declined 17% since 2008, from 18.8 abortions per 1,000 women of 
reproductive age to 13.5. One possible explanation for such a strong decline is access in Texas to 
abortion providers. In 2011, there were 62 abortion providers in Texas, representing a 7% 
decrease since 2008, a stark change in the mere span of three years.147 This trend is represented 
in the graph below.  
 
148 
 
In considering the decline in the number of abortion providers, it is also important to note the 
degree of accessibility that women have to providers in Texas. In 2011, 93% of Texas counties 
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had no abortion clinic, yet 35% of Texas women lived in those counties.149 As legislation in the 
pro-life Texas legislature concerning abortion providers continues to be pushed forward, as seen 
most recently with the enactment of House Bill 2, it is clear that the decline in abortion providers 
is in one way or another connected to the requirement that abortion clinicians obtain admitting 
privileges. Since House Bill 2 was voted upon in a second special legislative session, called by a 
Republican governor in a state with a majority pro-life legislature, it is also evident that that the 
decline in abortion providers is inherently connected to the action of conservative, pro-life 
legislators.  
 
House Bill 2  
 For June 2013, one woman’s name dominated political newsreels, headlines, and social 
media pages not only in Texas, but nationwide. Her name was Wendy Davis and she rose to 
fame in less than 24 hours; “she was a state senator Tuesday morning. By Wednesday, she was a 
political celebrity known across the nation. But also hoarse, hungry and thirsty.”150 As mentioned 
at the start of the thesis, Wendy Davis’ famous 11-hour filibuster in 2013 grabbed the attention 
of pro-life and pro-choice advocates across the nation, bringing Texas’ most recent legislative 
effort to restrict abortion, H.B. 2, into the limelight. What State Senator Davis was standing up 
against was a proposed bill that would impose new standards upon abortion providers that would 
effectively lead to the closure of all but five abortion clinics in Texas.151 House Bill 2 bans 
abortions after 20 weeks of pregnancy and medical abortions after seven weeks; it requires that 
abortion clinics meet the same standards as hospital-style surgical centers and that women visit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 “State Reproductive Health Profile: Texas.” 
150 Manny Fernandez, “In Texas, a Senator’s Stand Catches the Spotlight,” New York Times, June 26, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/. 
151 Fernandez, “Abortion Restrictions Become Law in Texas, but Opponents Will Press Fight.” 
	   50	  
the clinic four separate times before completing the procedure (one visit for a sonogram, a 
second and third for doses of a drug, and a fourth for a follow-up); and finally it mandates that all 
physicians conducting the procedure have hospital admitting privileges within 30 miles of the 
clinic where he or she is performing the abortion.152 The first three provisions went into effect 
November 1, 2013, causing nine abortion providers to close in the first four months. This will 
most likely be exacerbated even further when the surgical-center requirement goes into effect on 
September 1, 2014,153 resulting in the closing of an additional 19 abortion providers.154 The bill 
has generated strong support from both sides of the abortion debate, including several 
organizations that have filed briefs for the Planned Parenthood v. Abbott case dealing with 
House Bill 2. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),155 the American Medical 
Association (AMA), and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)156 
filed amicus briefs in support of Planned Parenthood. Texas Alliance to Life157 and Americans 
United for Life158 also contributed to the amicus briefs on behalf of Abbott. 
 Republicans dominate both houses of the Texas legislature; and Governor Rick Perry is 
pro-life. House Bill 2 failed to pass before the end of the legislative session on May 27, 2013, 
prompting Governor Perry to call a special legislative session. When a preliminary version of the 
bill passed through the Senate, Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst wrote, “we fought to pass 	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[House Bill 2] the Senate last night [and] this is why!”159 He followed up with a graphic that 
depicted how the legislation would force many Texas clinics to close.160 Ironically, Dewhurst 
retreated from his statements when he was criticized for claims that were contrary to helping 
women’s health and safety. When he received attention from opponents for what they called a 
Republican “backdoor statewide ban on abortion,” he tried to soften the fact that the graphic he 
had posted revealed the true goal of the legislation, which was to close abortion clinics. Instead 
he wrote that he and the bill were “unapologetically pro-life and for women’s health.”161 His 
defense against accusations for utilizing a manipulative legislative strategy was merely that he 
and the legislation were for women’s health; yet no additional evidence supporting this claim 
was offered. Dewhurst’s view was shared by Governor Perry, who after passage said, “the 
Senate continues its important work in support of women’s health and protecting the lives of our 
most vulnerable Texans,”162 despite no more than six months earlier having declared his goal to 
“make abortion a thing of the past.”163 After the bill passed through the House, it faced Wendy 
Davis’ filibuster in the Senate, which succeeded in stalling the legislative session, preventing a 
vote on the bill. Yet, House Bill 2 was brought up in a second special legislative session called 
by Governor Perry, and Wendy Davis’ filibuster efforts were defeated. Although there were clear 
signs of a coordinated conservative strategy aimed at restricting abortion, the Republican Party 
still was able to dominate the Texas legislative vote, allowing House Bill 2 to become law.  
 After the special session in July, the ACLU, the Center for Reproductive Rights, Planned 
Parenthood of Greater Texas and the owners of several other Texas clinics brought a legal 
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challenge against the new law, Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services et 
al. v. Gregory Abbott, Attorney General of Texas. The suit specifically challenged two provisions 
of the law, the requirement that abortion providers obtain admitting privileges, and the ban on 
medication abortion after seven weeks of pregnancy. The lawsuit pitted pro-life and pro-choice 
advocates against each other. Ironically, both sides relied on a concern for women’s health as the 
centerpiece of their arguments, abortion rights lawyers said that the provisions would have 
“dramatic and draconian” effects on women’s access to the procedure, but lawyers for the state 
countered by saying that these predictions “were exaggerated and that the measures served the 
state’s interest in “protecting fetal life.”164 Three months after House Bill 2 became law, Judge 
Lee Yeakel of the U.S. District Court in Austin accepted the argument of the pro-choice groups 
and abortion clinics, blocking the provision that would have required doctors performing the 
procedure to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital.165 In his opinion he concluded, “The 
act's admitting-privileges provision is without a rational basis and places a substantial obstacle in 
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a non-viable fetus.”166 Declaring the state’s argument 
insufficient, he wrote, “admitting privileges make no difference in the quality of care received by 
an abortion patient in an emergency room.”167  He went on to predict that the law would result in 
the closing of several clinics,  
 
By requiring abortion providers to have hospital admitting privileges, the 
evidence is that there will be abortion clinics that will close. The record reflects 
that 24 counties in the Rio Grande Valley would be left with no abortion provider 
because those providers do not have admitting privileges and are unlikely to get 	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them.168 
 
Judge Yeakel’s ruling confirmed what later proved to be true of the consequences of enacting 
House Bill 2. But only three days after he blocked the new provision of the law, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans, reversed the decision, allowing the 
rule to go into effect while it considered the appeal.169 On March 27, 2014, the Court of Appeals 
upheld the law on that basis that it did not pose an undue burden on women’s rights.170 It claimed 
that the District Court opinion applied the wrong legal standards and “erred in finding that the 
admitting privileges requirement amounts to an undue burden for a “large fraction” of the 
women that it affects.”171 Both the medication abortion provision and the admitting privileges 
provision were upheld. As New York Times writer Erik Eckholm explained, “the decision was 
not unexpected because the Appeals Court, in New Orleans, is considered conservative and has 
previously signaled that it was likely to find the law constitutional.”172 Given the blatant 
conservative influence throughout the process of House Bill 2 being passed, it is important to 
further assess how conservative, pro-life advocates shaped their arguments so as to keep the law 
in place.  
 
The Influence of Americans United for Life 
 Despite intense opposition by the pro-choice organizations and abortion clinics in Texas, 
the law restricting abortion providers was passed. In the wake of the Court of Appeals decision, 
Brigitte Amiri of the ACLU Women’s Reproductive Freedom project wrote,  	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You might start by asking who proposed this law. Was it a medical organization? 
Nope. A doctors' group? Nope. All of the major medical organizations, including 
the American Medical Association, the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, and the Texas Hospitals Association, all opposed this law. 
Rather, this bill came from Americans United for Life (AUL), a group dedicated 
to making abortion if not illegal, then impossible to get. AUL has touted 
restrictions like these as great ways to shut down abortion providers. And 
tellingly, this law only applies to doctors who provide abortion.173 
 
   
This is important because it signifies that the restrictive abortion laws are not in fact derived 
from scientific research showing a connection between stricter abortion regulations and 
improved health and safety for women, but instead from a conservative organization that seeks to 
limit abortion access by providing legislative models to republican legislators. The influence of 
AUL in the passage of House Bill 2, as well as the subsequent ruling in favor of pro-life 
conservatives, was not surprising considering President and CEO Youst’s support following the 
July special session. After the bill passed, Youst praised Governor Rick Perry, as well as House 
and Senate members, for “protecting the lives and health of women too often victimized in 
abortion clinics,”174 reiterating the efforts that conservative pro-life organizations have made to 
reframe the abortion debate in terms of public health. Criticizing an abortion lobby that is “out of 
touch with the American people,” as well as the “unmonitored and unsupervised abortion 
industry,”175 she portrayed the pro-life activists as compassionate, concerned individuals. Her 
words echo the sentiment heard from pro-life legislators across the nation: “Texans asked for 
greater protections for women and girls, and their legislators responded. For too long, the 
abortion lobby has bullied the country through the courts, but a desire for common-sense 
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regulation of abortion is being heard across the country.”176  
 What is troubling about this is the fact that the same model legislation is being used 
nationwide, applying the same restrictive laws to states with varying degrees of abortion 
incidence. In 2011, AUL was able to claim credit for 24 new restrictive abortion laws that were 
enacted.177 As Jordan Goldberg, a lawyer at the Center for Reproductive Rights, claims, “it’s 
troubling when you see the same bill language introduced in 27 states that you know came out of 
an anti-abortion think tank in Washington instead of coming from the corners of the sponsor or 
that particular state.”178 The consistency with which AUL’s model legislation has been adopted 
makes it difficult to deny the fact that the model laws are part of a larger legislative strategy 
aimed at limiting abortion access. The ulterior motives are not difficult to spot; “for us, it is very 
much a military strategy,” explained Youst, “Never attack where the enemy is strongest…We 
pick our battles. What we do is very much under the radar screen.”179 With language like this, it 
is difficult to find evidence of a sincere, compassionate concern for women’s health and safety. 
For AUL, empty promises of compassion are only one piece in the much larger puzzle that 
makes up their legislative strategy.  
 Aside from the strong connection between the language in AUL’s “Women’s Health 
Protection Act” and the language of House Bill 2, AUL has also involved itself in the legal 
battle, submitting an amicus curie brief for Planned Parenthood v. Abbott in support of the state. 
The intricacy of AUL’s involvement in Texas abortion legislation is indisputable. In the 2013 
AUL state legislative session report, for example, AUL praised Texas for enacting the 
requirement that abortion clinics meet the same patient care standards as facilities performing 
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outpatient surgeries, as well as the requirement that regulates the provision of medication 
abortion. AUL attributes the regulations to AUL model legislation, the Abortion Patient 
Enhanced Safety Act and Abortion-Inducing Drugs Safety Act, respectively.180 In the report, 
AUL begins by acknowledging its success: “Americans United for Life and AUL Action 
spearheaded 2013 state legislative efforts to enact life-affirming laws that both built on 2011 and 
2012’s significant gains and laid the groundwork for future victories in 2014 and beyond.”181 
The report then proceeds to describe “AUL victories” for individual states. For Texas, AUL 
writes, “Texas enacted a requirement that abortion clinics meet the same patient care standards 
as other facilities performing outpatient surgeries. The measure was inspired by AUL’s Abortion 
Patient Enhanced Safety Act.”182 Proceeding even further to describe it’s involvement with 
Texas abortion legislation, and confirming any suspicion of HB 2 being connected to AUL 
model legislation, the report shows that “AUL and its allies helped Texas enact a measure 
requiring individual abortion providers to have hospital admitting privileges.”183 These were just 
two of the six different legislative models that AUL recommended for Texas in 2012,184 but the 
desire to take credit for the organization’s role in the legislative strategy signifies that TRAP 
laws truly are a manifestation of a socially conservative movement aimed at eliminating a 
women’s right to choose through the targeting of abortion providers.  
 
The Pro-Life/Pro-Choice Argument 
 In the aftermath of the legislative special session in July, pro-choice advocates, women 
and Texas abortion providers were concerned about the impact that the law would have on 	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women’s access to abortion. As Amy Hagstrom Miller, chief executive of the abortion clinic 
organization in Texas, Whole Woman’s Health, explained, “Patients are walking through the 
door, they are crying—they are freaking out […] We can’t stay open without any sources of 
income.”185 The provision requiring doctors performing abortions to have admitting privileges at 
nearby hospitals would most likely force the closing of clinics that relied heavily on local 
hospitals or visiting doctors, leaving only five abortion clinics, in Austin, San Antonio, Dallas 
and Houston that actually met the standards.186 The threatened closure of Texas clinics was a 
crucial point in the pro-choice arguments surrounding House Bill 2. The Court of Appeals in 
Planned Parenthood v. Abbott, however, did not find this to be of major or convincing concern. 
Referencing the federal court opinion, the majority argued,  
 
The opinion’s finding that “there will be abortion clinics that will close” is too 
vague. The opinion made no “baseline” finding as to precisely how many abortion 
doctors currently lack admitting privileges required by House Bill 2. Planned 
Parenthood cannot resurrect its assertion that one-third of the state’s clinics will 
close or over 22,000 women will be deprived of access to abortion services each 
year because the District Court also refused to accept these findings. Although 
some clinics may be required to shut their doors, there is no showing whatsoever 
that any woman will lack reasonable access to a clinic within Texas.187 
 
This part of the opinion is significant because it disregards the aspect of the provision that is 
most damaging to women, access to clinics that provide not only abortion services, but to other 
essential reproductive health services that are a necessary component of women’s health and 
reproductive safety. The structure of the legislation, shaped with the help of pro-life activists, 
makes it difficult for women to prove to a panel of conservative judges the extent to which the 
clinics are closing. The damage that the law has produced in less than a year speaks to the need 	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for intervention. As executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Texas, Terri 
Burke, points out, “What makes Texas different is our size: House Bill 2 leaves 35 percent of the 
population without access to abortion care and those are rural and, often, poor women.”188 
Referring in its amicus brief to the closing of two of the six ASCs providing abortions, in Austin 
and Fort Worth, the ACLU argues,  
 
The record shows that as a result of the admitting privileges requirement, more 
than 20,000 women annually would no longer be able to access abortion due to 
the shortfall in capacity among remaining providers. Given that over 60,000 
women will seek abortion each year in Texas, this amounts to approximately one 
in three women unable to effectuate their constitutionally protected choice to 
terminate a pregnancy. This number is solely related to capacity; it does not 
include those women who cannot overcome other obstacles created by the 
requirement, such as women forced to travel significant distances to access 
services because a closer provider lacks privileges.189  
  
The reality of the situation is that most women cannot feasibly access the few clinics that will 
remain open in the cities.  
 In its amicus brief for Planned Parenthood v. Abbott, the American Medical Association 
(AMA) provided a clear example of this harsh reality. It explained that as a result of the 
requirement, the only two clinics in the lower Rio Grande Valley were forced to shut down, 
making the closest abortion provider 150 miles away, and the closest ambulatory surgical center 
250 miles away.190 This adds approximately eight extra hours of travel time for any of the 
275,000 women of reproductive age living in the Rio Grande Valley near the Texas-Mexican 
border. As the AMA explained, “Even for women who do have the resources to travel, the travel 
required may force some women to delay their procedures until later in pregnancy, which 	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…increases their exposure to complications and risks.”191 In direct contradiction to what pro-life 
legislators asserted about the provision helping to improve the health and safety of women, it 
actually makes the process for Texas women inherently more dangerous.  If we look at the graph 
below, the extent of lost access to clinics is dramatic. It is important to note that since the 
enactment of the admitting privileges requirement in November of 2013, nine clinics have 
closed. Looking at the dark yellow marks representing these nine clinics, it is clear that several of 
these clinics were located in the peripheral regions of Texas. Additionally, many clinics are 
subject to closure under the provision of House Bill 2 that requires abortion clinics to meet the 
same standards as ambulatory surgical centers (ASC). This provision is set to begin on 
September 1st, 2014 and has yet to be challenged in court, however, the graphic shows that by 
September, only six clinics will remain. Looking to the blue marks representing the remaining 
clinics, it is clear that the geographical location will make it difficult for women living in the 
more rural areas to access abortion services, given that the remaining clinics are centered in the 
city locations. 
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192 
 
 
 
Women’s Health and Safety 
 At this point in Texas, TRAP laws have become a dominant legislative strategy. Pro-life 
politicians who are connected to active conservative organizations like Americans United for 
Life utilize the laws to restrict access to abortion in a very effective way. Abortion opponents 
reframe the abortion issue in terms of public health and a concern for women’s reproductive 
safety, but it is a sham argument. The validity, or legitimacy of a pro-life or pro-choice claim 
with respect to legislation now must relate to a concern for women’s health. Take for example 
Dr. John Throp, an Obstetrician Gynecologist who spoke on behalf of the state in Planned 
Parenthood v. Abbott. He provided four main benefits for supporting the admitting privileges 
requirement: 
 
(a) It provides a more thorough evaluation mechanism of physician competency 
which better protects patient safety; (b) it acknowledges and enables the 
importance of continuity of care; (c) it enhances inter-physician communication 	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and optimizes patient information transfer and complication management; and (d) 
it supports the ethical duty of care for the operating physician to prevent patient 
abandonment.193  
  
With language that strongly emphasizes a safer environment for abortions with a high level of 
accountability, Dr. Thorp succeeds in making a compelling argument. The 5th Circuit Court of 
Appeals accepted both the continuity of care and credentialing “benefits” in its decision. Yet, as 
pro-choice proponents point out, the measures taken in the name of preserving women’s health 
are unnecessary, and play up the dangers of abortion. In its amicus brief, the AMA argues that 
the privileges requirement imposed by House Bill 2 does nothing to enhance the safety of 
healthcare for women, and there is no medically sound reason for Texas to impose more 
stringent requirements. According to Texas statistics from 2011, there have been no reported 
maternal deaths out of 227,912 abortions in Texas since 2008.194  The AMA also explains, 
“continuity of care is achieved through communication and collaboration between specialized 
health care providers, which does not depend on those providers having hospital privileges.”195 
Rather than helping to ensure that the specific quality of care necessary in the clinics is achieved, 
the hospital privileges requirement places an obstacle in the way of physicians, making it 
difficult for them to comply, and therefore forcing clinics to close. The law specifically targets 
clinicians who provide abortions, and not those covering other outpatient procedures, regardless 
of the greater risk those procedures may carry.196 The blatant discrepancies speak directly to the 
strategic objectives of pro-life legislators. This is important because it shows how House Bill 2, 
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and state pro-life legislation in general, is serving as a tool for conservative pro-life advocates 
who seek to reframe the abortion debate in terms of women’s health and safety.     
 Rather than improving women’s reproductive health, the burden imposed by the 
admitting privileges requirement will prevent women from obtaining safe abortions altogether, 
which could lead some women to self-induce abortion. As the AMA points out, Texas already 
has a higher average number of attempts to self-induce an abortion than the national average, 
which is 2.8%.197 Evidence suggests that such attempts will become more common under House 
Bill 2.198 A 2013 report investigating abortion in Texas revealed that the most concerning aspect 
of House Bill 2 was the effect that it would have on the health of Texas women and the potential 
rise of abortion self-induction, especially low income and young women who lack appropriate 
resources to travel. The researchers explained,  
In 2012, we conducted a survey with 318 women seeking abortion in six cities 
across the state to assess the impact of the 2011 restrictions. We found that 7% of 
women reported taking something on their own in order to try to end their current 
pregnancy before coming to the abortion clinic. This proportion was even higher 
— about 12% — among women at clinics near the Mexican border.”199  
 
 
Despite evidence pointing to the fact that further restrictions will exacerbate health concerns for 
Texas women seeking an abortion, abortion opponents press further, making sure that their word 
is heard. A clear example of this is seen with Texas Right to Life lobbyist Emily Horne, who 
alleged that the conditions of Texas clinics that auditors found in 2012 “could have easily lead to 
women getting sick or injured.”200 Her language, though seemingly of serious concern, is mere 
speculation, and contradicts the fact that the Department of State Health Services deemed all 
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facilities’ corrective actions plans sufficient to protect patients.201 The anti-abortion strategy is a 
manipulation of the facts, designed to achieve the ultimate goal, which is to enforce stringent 
requirements upon providers so as to make an abortion difficult to obtain.  
 In March of 2014, two clinics operated by Whole Woman’s Health were forced to shut 
down, contributing to the decline and making the total number of clinics in Texas 24, from the 
44 that were running in 2011.202 Whole Women’s Health founder Amy Hagstrom Miller explains 
that the main reason several of the clinics have been forced to close is due to the difficulties that 
physicians encountered in obtaining admitting privileges.203 The number of clinics is estimated 
to drop even more with the enactment of the ambulatory hospital standards for clinics in 
September. What will this mean for women in distant counties who need to obtain an abortion, or 
basic assistance that helps to improve their reproductive health and safety? Will they drive the 
100-200 miles? And even if they do, is travelling over 100 miles really the solution that pro-life 
advocates see for improving women’s reproductive health and safety? After all, Governor Perry 
and other Republicans have repeatedly said that House Bill 2 will improve patient safety and 
hold abortion clinics to safer standards,204 and pro-life advocates like Joe Pojman, executive 
director of Texas Alliance for Life, have supported the legislature, declaring on behalf of his pro-
life organization, “we are pleased that women will never again receive substandard care from 
either of these abortion facilities.”205 The facts are clear but the legislative strategy is more 
potent. In order to change the direction that Texas legislators and Americans United for Life are 
taking women’s health, the false concern for safety and the realities of the new burdensome 
TRAP laws must be exposed.  	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 When Wendy Davis stepped down from the podium after her 11-hour filibuster, the threat 
that restrictive legislation presented to women was likely more unambiguous and 
comprehensible than it ever had been to Texas senators familiar with the law. Yet despite the 
brief setback to the legislative process, the law was enacted soon after, because of the 
conservative Republican leadership. After House Bill 2 passed the following month, Wendy 
Davis said, “the fight for the future of Texas is just beginning.”206 Her words are telling not only 
for Texas, but also for the abortion issue nationwide. The socially conservative strategy has taken 
on a new dynamic that is gaining strength and momentum, and all the while doing so under the 
guise of concern for women’s health and safety. The future for women’s reproductive health is 
no longer concerned simply with access to abortion, but also with the risk of all reproductive 
services being eliminated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Schwartz, “Texas Clinics Stop Abortions After Court Ruling.” 
	   65	  
Chapter 4: Ambulatory Surgical Center Standards in North Carolina 
 
"It's not too difficult to imagine that somewhere in some major pro-abortion 
organization, there's a bull's-eye with Charmaine's face in the middle" - Gary Bauer, 
AUL President Charmaine Yoest’s former boss at the Family Research Council207  
 
 “Sometimes a plate of cookies is just a plate of cookies.”208 These were the words of Kim 
Genardo, communications director for Governor Pat McCrory of North Carolina, the day after 
the Governor had signed a controversial piece of restrictive abortion legislation in July, 2013. 
What Ms. Genardo was referring to was a hasty public relations move, in which Governor 
McCrory had offered chocolate chip cookies to protesters outside of his mansion the day after 
the bill signing.209 The men and women who had gathered outside his home were protesting 
against Senate Bill 353, a piece of legislation that would effectively lead to the closing of several 
North Carolina abortion clinics. The Bill itself had its own problematic implications, but what 
the protesters really were riled up about was the fact that McCrory, who had only recently been 
elected Governor that past November, had turned on his campaign promise. When a version of 
the legislation first passed through the North Carolina Congress in July, 2013, McCrory 
vehemently opposed it, calling it an attempt at restricting access to abortion. Yet two weeks later 
when a new version of the legislation (with the exact same implications) was proposed, he voted 
for it. The cookie gimmick, whatever is true intention, was hardly successful. The Governor’s 
actions, however, rang loud and true. In response to the public relations move, the protesters 
slipped the plate under the mansion gate, attaching a note that read, “We want women’s health 
care, not cookies.”210 The message, a mere seven words, summed up an issue that has been 	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gaining significant traction nationwide, namely that restrictive TRAP laws are leading to closed 
abortion clinics. In its simplest form, the Governor’s actions were just another example of the 
Republican strategy to reframe the abortion debate, making clinics the biggest enemy to 
women’s health and safety.  
 This chapter will, like Chapter 3, reveal the true impact that TRAP laws have on 
women’s access to abortion clinics. It will show that not only are the conservative legislators 
who favor these laws providing false justification as part of a deceptive strategy for successful 
enactment, but also that the resulting impact of the laws is detrimental to women’s health and 
safety. This chapter will start by providing an overview of the abortion incidence in North 
Carolina. The discussion will then explain the process in which the North Carolina legislature 
came to accept the final piece of legislation, SB 353, as well as the deceitful behavior on behalf 
of Republican legislators that contributed to its passage. Finally, it will focus on the impact that 
the law will have on abortion clinics in North Carolina and explain why the purported health 
issues used to defend the legislation are in fact untrue. Rather, the new law is a manifestation of 
conservative pro-life efforts intended to both change the terms of the debate about abortion and 
achieve their true goal, which is to make abortion unavailable.  
 
Abortion in North Carolina 
 Like the trend in Texas, abortion in North Carolina has been on the decline. Currently the 
state requires that a woman receive state-directed counseling designed to discourage abortion, 
wait 24 hours before going through with the procedure, and obtain parental consent if she is a 
minor. Additionally, it requires that public funding and insurance for abortion only be provided 
in cases of life endangerment, rape or incest, and that the use of medication abortion is 
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prohibited.211 This recent shift reflects a considerable decline in the number of abortions 
performed, especially in the past ten years. In 2011, 28,600 women obtained abortions in North 
Carolina, compared to 37,610 in 2000.212 The rate of abortions has declined 15% since 2008, 
when it was 17.1 abortions per 1,000, compared to 14.6 in 2011.213 The graph below represents 
this trend. Although it is important to consider that women may be travelling from surrounding 
states to obtain a procedure, the strong decline is noteworthy and merits further investigation.  
 
 
            214 
 
As postulated for Texas, the decline in the number of abortions may be attributable to a parallel 
decline in the number of providers. As seen by the graph below, despite the slight increase in 
2011, the number of North Carolina providers has been steadily declining. In 2000, there were 55 	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providers in the state, as compared to 36 in 2011.215 Sixteen of these providers are abortion 
clinics, only one of which meets the standards of an outpatient surgical center.216 This is 
important, because the legislation signed by Governor McCrory in July of 2013 would require 
clinics to adhere to some, if not many, outpatient surgical center standards, as will be discussed 
later in the chapter.  
 
217 
             
 
Given the fact that a state as large as Texas has 62 providers, and North Carolina is closely 
matched with 36, it would seem as though North Carolina is serving its population of 
reproductive women relatively well. Yet, the reality is that in 2011, 90% of North Carolina 
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counties had no abortion clinic, with 53% of North Carolina women living in those areas.218 The 
majority of North Carolina abortion clinics are located within the center of the state in 
Mecklenburg County, Orange County, Durham County, Wake County and Forsyth County.219 
Notably, Mecklenburg is near Charlotte, a major city; Orange, Durham and Wake are centered 
around Raleigh, the state capital; and Forsyth is in between the two cities. Looking to the most 
recent abortion legislation in the state, SB 353, it is clear that the difficulty that women may 
already have in accessing a clinic will become worse.  
 
House Bill 695 and Senate Bill 353 
 The process that led to the passage of SB 353 began with the election campaign of 
Governor McCrory in October of 2012. In the month before the gubernatorial elections, during 
an October 24, 2012 debate, a local North Carolina news reporter asked McCrory what further 
restrictions on abortion he would agree to sign if elected for Governor. His response was 
“none.”220 McCrory was elected Governor that November. Six months later, in July 2013, his 
words were brought back into public view.  
 In the 2013 legislative session, House Bill 695, the “Family, Faith and Freedom 
Protection Act” was passed in the House on May 16, 2013.221 The Bill was mainly designed to 
prohibit the recognition of foreign laws in family courts, such as Islamic Sharia Law. Then, when 
the Bill moved to the Senate to be considered for a vote, a provision was added that would 
require abortion clinics to meet the same standards as ambulatory surgical centers, as well as to 	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have “transfer agreements” with nearby hospitals.222 The provision, given the strict requirements 
it would impose on abortion providers, essentially would have the same effect as the admitting 
privileges provision did in Texas. The Senate waited until the end of the legislative session was 
only a few weeks away, and passed HB 695 on July 7, 2013 with the new requirement,  
 
The Department of Health and Human Services (Department) shall amend its 
rules pertaining to clinics certified by the Department to be suitable facilities for 
the performance of abortions…The rules shall ensure that standards for the 
clinics certified by the Department to be suitable facilities for the performance of 
abortions are similar to those for the licensure of ambulatory surgical centers. 
These rules shall address the on-site recovery phase of patient care at the clinic as 
well as the requirement for a transfer agreement between a clinic and a hospital.223 
 
  
At this point, Governor McCrory, whether upset at the underhanded approach taken by the 
Senate to passing the bill, or by the language of the bill itself, expressed his disagreement. 
Threatening to veto the measure, he said that parts of the bill were clearly aimed at restricting 
access to abortion, rather than improving the safety of the procedure.224 Since it became clear to 
the legislature that the Governor was not going to sign HB 695 with the abortion provision 
attached, the bill was not put to a further vote, and was removed from the legislative calendar 
three days later. 
 With the legislative session set to end on July 26, 2013 and the abortion initiative 
essentially squandered with HB 695, the North Carolina Senate picked up a new piece of 
legislation. The legislation, Senate Bill 353, was a bill on motorcycle safety that had passed a 
first reading in the Senate in April. While the Bill was being considered in the House, a Senate 
recommendation was added. The new recommendation included similar restrictions on abortion 
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that were seen earlier with HB 695. In the Bill, the state Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) was directed to revise the rules for abortion clinics.225 The discretion of the 
DHHS was outlined in Section 4 of the Bill; “the Department is authorized to apply any 
requirement for the licensure of ambulatory surgical centers to the standards applicable to clinics 
certified by the Department to be suitable facilities for the performance of abortions.”226 In 
addition to authorizing the application of ASC standards, the legislation ensured that the 
Department would address the on-site recovery phase of patient care at the clinic, protect patient 
privacy, provide quality assurance, and ensure that patients with complications receive the 
necessary medical attention.227 Although it was left to the discretion of the DHHS to set the 
standards for the clinics, some of the same regulations that apply to ambulatory surgical centers 
would apply to the clinics. This would impose burdensome structural requirements that were 
irrelevant to patient safety and abortion procedures, such as door and hallway widths, guaranteed 
square footage per operating room, and mandatory water fountains in waiting facilities.228  
 The House passed its final version of SB 353 with the provision related to the DHHS on 
July 11, 2013. This time, the Governor voiced no immediate opposition. The Bill returned to the 
Senate for its final vote, and was passed on July 25, 2013, one day before the end of the 
legislative session. Four days later, Governor McCrory signed the bill into law. By allowing the 
DHHS to use ambulatory surgical center standards for abortion clinic inspections, the lawmakers 
successfully reframed abortion as a public health issue. The law was pushed forward by a 
Republican majority in the legislature first under the guise of a bill concerning religion in family 
courts, and second as a bill related to motorcycle safety.  	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 Given the entire legislative process and the non-public last minute changes to the bill, the 
enactment of Senate Bill 353 was received with significant criticism, since it seemed to 
deliberately subject abortion clinic inspections to unnecessary standards. North Carolina 
Democratic Senator Floyd McKissick said,  “The only thing this bill does is to try in every legal 
way that’s conceivably possible to deny a woman the right to choose…we’re trouncing upon the 
rights and the options of women in this state and in my mind, it’s unconstitutional.”229 Also 
acknowledging the detrimental impact of the law was Representative Rick Glazier, who 
explained that for most women in North Carolina, “there’s a pretty strong fear that it’s going to 
shut down most access to abortion services in the state.”230 Yet despite the clear indications that 
the law goes beyond the scope of what is necessary for inspecting abortion clinics, Republican 
legislators continue to defend it.  
 Immediately after its enactment, the Governor and several conservative congressmen, 
like Republican Representative Ruth Samuelson, tried to defend the law against these 
accusations, claiming that the law was in fact aimed at improving women’s health and safety, 
and not just an attempt to apply burdensome standards in the hopes of shutting down the clinics. 
Samuelson said, “this is really about protecting the health and safety of women…we are not out 
here trying to shut down every abortion clinic in North Carolina.”231 Her sentiment reflected that 
of Governor McCrory, who said of the legislation that he “wasn’t limiting access to the 
procedure, but rather was signing a measure that would result in safer conditions for North 
Carolina women.”232  
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 In an attempt to defend his actions, the Governor only further solidified his alliance with 
the conservative Republican strategy aimed at restricting abortion through onerous and unrelated 
legislation. In a post legislative session news conference he said, “Because of the veto threat [on 
HB 695], that bill was changed to our satisfaction…We're not going to limit access in those 
facilities. We're going to increase the safety..."233 McCrory even went so far as to say, “[SB 353] 
does not further limit access and those who contend it does are more interested in politics than 
the health and safety of our citizens.”234 His response to SB 353 received especially strong 
criticism because of his campaign pledge during the gubernatorial election eight months earlier, 
in which he said he would not sign any further restrictions to abortion. He also had declared that 
he would veto House Bill 695, but then went ahead and signed Senate Bill 353. The two bills, 
although slightly different, would have the same effect in restricting access to clinics. McCrory 
attributed his change to the fact that HB 695 would have required clinics to meet the ASC 
standards, as compared to SB 353, which only required the DHHS to use the ambulatory surgical 
rules as a guide, “while not unduly restricting access” to abortion.235 The difference that 
McCrory was referring to was a slight change to the designation of responsibility, which in 
practical application would make no difference to those operating any of the 16 North Carolina 
abortion facilities. The use of the ASC standard was not completely eliminated.  
 Depending on what regulations are drafted by the DHHS under SB 353, it could still 
force expensive upgrades that abortion clinics may find too costly or physically impossible to 
comply with because of their locations.236 According to Drexdal Pratt, director of DHHS' 
Division of Health Service Regulation, an ambulatory surgical center costs about $1 million 
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more to build than a regular clinic.237 If the DHHS decides to apply all requirements of 
ambulatory surgical centers to clinics, only one clinic will meet the outpatient surgery 
requirements necessary to remain open, Femcare Inc. in Asheville. Governor McCrory’s shift in 
support for a law related to ambulatory surgical center standards revealed his true intentions with 
respect to restrictive abortion legislation. The coordinated conservative effort to enact such 
legislation does in fact relate to the way that conservative, pro-life governors will vote, and it is 
important because it can cause a detrimental impact on women’s access to reproductive services.   
 
 
The Department for Health and Human Services and Femcare Inc.  
 
 Given the deceptive way in which the law was passed and the way in which the Governor 
flipped on his campaign promise, it is necessary to look at the impact of SB 353. Less than a 
month after SB 353 was signed into law, the North Carolina Department of Health and Human 
Services suspended the license of Asheville abortion clinic, Femcare Inc., citing safety violations 
that were discovered in a recent inspection. The inspection was conducted on July 18th and 19th 
in 2013,238 just nine days before the new restrictive legislation was officially enacted. The 
suspension report cited violations that included a failure to maintain anesthesia delivery systems 
in good working condition, a failure to ensure weekly checks on emergency equipment, a failure 
to have a resuscitator available, as well as a failure to have an agreement or contract with a 
registered anesthetist and registered pharmacist.239 Immediately after the clinic was suspended, 
Lorraine Cummings released a statement on behalf of FemCare Inc. stating,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Allie Jones, “The Precarious State of Abortion Clinics in North Carolina,” The Wire, August 1, 2013, 
http://www.thewire.com/. 
238 “Femcare License Suspended,” WLOS News13, last accessed April 13, 2014, 
http://www.wlos.com/template/cgi-bin/archived.pl?type=basic&file=/shared/news/features/top-
stories/stories/archive/2013/07/IDs5BD1b.xml. 
239 Ibid.  
	   75	  
 
Standards that were acceptable when we were last inspected have changed and, as 
soon as we were notified of them two weeks ago, we began the process of 
meeting each one of them. We have had no patient infections using our former 
protocols. We expect to be in compliance soon with the required standards and 
will return to serving our patients as soon as possible.240  
 
Also, the DHHS noted that Femcare Inc.’s last inspection was on January 16, 2007.241 This 
speaks to the plausibility of a deceptive Republican legislative strategy, considering that the 
enactment of strict TRAP laws, with provisions for ASC requirements on clinics, has been 
gaining significant traction since 2010.242 Since there were no DHHS inspections conducted in 
the years since 2007, and then suddenly an inspection was conducted the week before SB 353 
was officially enacted, it is likely that the Republican officials deliberately targeted the clinic.  
 Femcare Inc. was willing to comply with the new standards, but it is important to 
reiterate that Femcare Inc. is the only abortion clinic in North Carolina that is also an ambulatory 
surgical center.243 In other words, Femcare Inc. is the only clinic that is actually able to comply 
with the new standards. For all other abortion providers who do not meet ambulatory surgical 
center standards, the new DHHS requirements would require major, costly renovations, or would 
force the clinic to shut down. Since SB 353 grants the DHHS broad discretion to utilize ASC 
standards in their investigations, it is noteworthy that Femcare Inc. was the first abortion clinic to 
be cited publicly for failing the inspection. NARAL Pro-Choice North Carolina executive 
director Suzanne Buckley pointed to the license suspension as yet another sign that the current 
system of clinic regulations was already effective,  
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The DHHS citations reinforce our position that the current regulations are 
working and SB 353 is unnecessary… Some have suggested that timing of the 
citations is suspicious and politically motivated. It certainly deserves further 
inquiry. Our efforts will continue to be focused on advancing and protecting 
access to reproductive healthcare for all North Carolinians.244 
 
 
Given the political implications, the threat to women’s health and safety seems to be a legislative 
means to another end; eliminating abortion. After all, Femcare Inc. was given DHHS approval to 
reopen on August 21, 2013, less than a month after its license was revoked.245 If the DHHS was 
clearly concerned about atrocious, unacceptable clinic conditions that were threatening to 
women’s health, one would think that a sustained effort to keep the clinic closed would take 
place on behalf of the inspectors and their Republican counterparts. After all, the director of the 
Division of Health Service Regulation for DHHS, Drexdal Pratt said, “We take rule violations 
very seriously, and when necessary, take firm action to prevent harm to patients and clients in the 
facilities that we license, regulate and inspect.”246 The fact that Femcare Inc. was only briefly 
suspended indicates that the legislation’s goal is political, and not part of a concerted effort to 
improve health standards. The assertions defending most TRAP laws, as seen in Texas and North 
Carolina, are based on the idea that the laws make abortion safer for women’s health. Yet, there 
is no evidence that shows that the new requirements do in fact enhance women’s health or safety.  
 As the health and safety of the woman continues to be pitted as the main concern for both 
pro-life and pro-choice advocates, it is worthwhile to understand the actual risks associated with 
the abortion procedure. According to a 2008 Guttmacher report, most abortions occur before 
nine weeks’ gestation, and the proportion of very early abortions (less than seven weeks) has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Robin Marty, “North Carolina Clinic License Suspended, But Clinic Expects to Reopen,” RH Reality Check, 
August 1, 2013, http://www.rhrealitycheck.com/. 
245 Robin Marty, “One North Carolina Abortion Clinic Reopens, Another Says It Will Turn Over Its License,” RH 
Reality Check, August 27, 2013, http://rhrealitycheck.org/tag/north-carolina-sb-353/.  
246 Robin Marty, “North Carolina Clinic License Suspended, But Clinic Expects to Reopen.” 
	   77	  
increased substantially since 1994.247 As seen by the charts below, which represent a compilation 
of data from Guttmacher reports published in 2008 and 2014, the percent of women obtaining 
abortions has remained relatively steady since 2004.  
 
 
WHEN WOMEN HAVE 
ABORTIONS248     
  
Approximate Percentage of Women 
Obtaining Abortion 
Gestational Age (weeks) 2004 2010   
Less than 7 28 33   
 7 to 8  33 30   
 9 to 12 27 26   
13 to 15  7 6   
16 to 20 4 4   
More than 21 1 1   
              
 
 
WHEN WOMEN HAVE 
ABORTIONS249       
  
Approximate Percentage of Women Obtaining 
Abortion 
Gestational Age (weeks) 2004 2010    
12 or less 89 89    
13 or more 11 11     
                     
 
From the data above, it is clear that a majority of women obtain abortions within the first 12 
weeks of pregnancy. In fact, one third of abortion procedures are completed within the first 
seven weeks. According to the National Abortion Federation, serious complications arising from 
abortions obtained within the first 12 weeks are unusual, and of these women, 97% report no 
complications; 2.5% have minor complications that can be handled at the medical office or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Stanley K. Henshaw and Kathryn Kost, Trends in the Characteristics of Women Obtaining Abortions, 1974 to 
2004 (New York: Guttmacher Institute, 2008).  
248 Ibid.  
249 Ibid.  
	   78	  
abortion facility; and less than 0.5% have more serious complications that require an additional 
surgical procedure.250 The risk of death associated with abortion increases as the length of the 
pregnancy increases. The risk of death is one for every one million abortions at or before eight 
weeks, to one per 29,000 at 16-20 weeks, and one per 11,000 at 21 weeks or later.251 That being 
said, it is important to note that the Republican led efforts to pass restrictive legislation, both in 
North Carolina and in the United States in general likely exacerbates the health risks of women 
seeking to obtain an abortion, since the law likely makes it more difficult and untimely to access 
a clinic and schedule a legal procedure.  
 Femcare Inc. is just the first in what will likely be several DHHS inspections in North 
Carolina that results in either the suspension or the closing of a clinic. In Femcare Inc.’s case, the 
clinic was able to stay open, but there are several others in the state who will most likely be 
forced to close. For example, the Baker Clinic for Women, located in Durham County near 
Raleigh, also had its license revoked in July 2013. Since then it has announced that it will 
voluntarily turn over its license rather than attempt to meet new ambulatory surgical center 
requirements and reopen.252 Baker exemplifies the problematic nature of SB 353, especially with 
respect to women’s access to abortion. Clinics that are unable to meet the new standards will be 
shut down, and the conservative legislative efforts will be successful. As Representative Rick 
Glazier (D) explained, the final version of SB 353 was a “rewrite by moonlight” and consistent 
with the legislature’s rightward tilt since Republicans had taken complete control of North 
Carolina’s government. He characterizes the Republicans as “an extreme legislative majority 
bent on eliminating the right to choice, [to the legislative majority] everything looks like a health 
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regulation, ready to be used and abused to dismantle access to that choice.”253 North Carolina 
experienced this rightward tilt in the 2010 elections, when Republicans swept the majority for 
both chambers of the General Assembly, allowing GOP majorities to be established in both the 
Senate and House.254 The legislature’s rightward tilt is not surprising for North Carolina, 
especially considering the ties between state office holders and the conservative American’s 
United for Life organization (AUL), which will be discussed next.  
 
Americans United for Life and the Conservative Movement 
 Critics of the SB 353 have continuously asserted that the Bill has nothing to do with 
women’s safety, pointing out the fact that the model legislation for the Bill, the Abortion 
Patient’s Enhanced Safety Act, was drafted by AUL.255 Given the nature of AUL’s involvement 
with other state legislatures and restrictive abortion legislation, the pro-choice assertion is 
convincing. SB 353, pushed through by the Republican majority in the final days of the 
legislative session, follows similar actions by Republican controlled legislatures in other states, 
as seen in the previous chapter with Governor Rick Perry’s calling of a second special legislative 
session that resulted in the enactment of House Bill 2.  AUL has recognized North Carolina’s 
efforts to enact stricter abortion legislation, contributing to public acknowledgement of 
Republican legislators’ role in passing the laws. In its 2014 Life List, meant to identify and rank 
states on the basis of how well they “protect life in law,” AUL named North Carolina as one of 
the year’s most improved states.256 By essentially applauding and granting public recognition to 
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North Carolina for its legislative efforts in 2013, including SB 353, AUL is encouraging 
conservative Republicans to push forward with the restrictive strategy. Further evidence appears 
in AUL’s state “report card” page, which includes several model legislation recommendations 
and priorities for North Carolina.257 
 So long as AUL continues to publicize its support for the legislative efforts of 
conservative Republican legislatures, as seen with the annual “Life List” publications and the 
booklet of model legislation, pro-life advocates will continue to successfully redefine abortion as 
a public health concern that is necessary for the reproductive safety of women. North Carolina is 
just one example of the increasingly large collection of pro-life states adopting this strategy. Hal 
C. Lawrence, vice president of the American Congress of Obstetrician and Gynecologists 
explained, “As we’ve seen in several other states, legislators are getting between women and 
their doctors.”258 This intervention not only reflects legislative dominance, but an ideology that is 
almost entirely contrary to the medical necessities concerning abortion. As the legislative efforts 
continue to become clearer, pro-choice advocates are catching on. At a NARAL pro-choice rally, 
a protester explained the issue plainly; speaking of Republican legislators he said, 
 
Tell them that some of us get it, that we know this is not really about abortion; it's 
about the critical America cornerstones of freedom and independence. It's about 
who knows best what's right for my family – my wife, my daughter, me? Or some 
politicians who think they know better. That's not what America is about.259  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 Americans United for Life, Pregnant Women’s Protection Act (Washington: Americans United for Life, 2010).  
“North Carolina Report Card,” Americans United for Life, last accessed April 9, 2014, 
http://www.aul.org/states/north-carolina/.  
258 “Ob-Gyns Oppose North Carolina Senate Rills,” The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
July 16, 2013, https://www.acog.org/About_ACOG/News_Room/News_Releases/2013/Ob-
Gyns_Oppose_North_Carolina_Senate_Bills. 
259 Illyse Hogue “Speech at North Carolina State House, Raleigh, NC, July 9, 2013,” NARAL Pro-Choice America, 
July 9, 2013, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/press-releases/2013/pr07092013_nc-rally-speech.html. 
	   81	  
The protester was getting at the heart of an issue that began with the Christian Right, and 
manifested over time into a legislative strategy that reshapes abortion access by changing laws so 
as to limit access to the procedure. It is for this reason that men like John L. Rustin, the president 
of the North Carolina Family Policy Council, can say that he considers SB 353 to be a “common 
sense measure and very rational.”260 Yet, what seems to have been forgotten, or at least clouded 
by recent successful legislative enactments, is the impact that these laws will have further down 
the road. Senator Earline W. Parmo (NC-D) explained, “When we fail to allow access, women 
will find other ways…When we over regulate to this extent and make regulations so rigid that 
medical facilities can’t meet those standards, that’s the choice we leave our women.”261 The full 
impact that SB 353 will have on North Carolina clinics has yet to be seen, but the predictions of 
detrimental effects to women’s access to reproductive health services are entirely convincing.   
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Conclusion 
 
“For today, the women of this Nation still retain the liberty to control their destinies. But 
the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows” - Harry Blackmun, U.S. 
Supreme Court, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989).262 
 
 North Carolina and Texas are just two examples of states that have succeeded in their 
efforts to enact TRAP legislation. All of the pieces were set in place; a pro-life Republican 
governor, a pro-life senate and pro-life house, model legislation from Americans United for Life, 
and several abortion providers that would not quite meet the mark once the law’s new standards 
were in effect. Restrictive abortion legislation has come to fit a new mold. It is no longer an 
effort aimed at the woman who is making the decision, but rather at the clinician or facility that 
is providing the service. Simply put, the informed consent laws that dominated the early 1990s 
cannot be compared to the ambulatory surgical center requirements that have emerged since 
2005. Although the former adds an emotionally charged obstacle for women deciding to obtain 
the abortion, it does not make the abortion procedure entirely inaccessible, as the latter has the 
potential to do. As legal correspondent Dhalia Lithwick explains,  
 
The anti-choice strategy has been to close as many clinics as possible and to 
sideline as many providers as possible by crafting “abortion regulations” […] that 
force doctors to attempt to obtain ever-elusive hospital admitting privileges; and 
that force clinics to widen hallways and rejigger broom closets. And all of this has 
been done under…the theory that just a few more regulations, warnings, and 
inches added to the clinic corridors will make them safer and more comfortable in 
the cruel world of abortion mills.263 
 
 
What Lithwick refers to is the problematic sequence that has made the entire TRAP law strategy 
concerning. To start, the Republican legislators’ assertion that the laws will improve the health 
and safety of women is an empty claim. As seen in previous chapters, women’s health and safety 	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are not the main concerns of the Republican legislators pushing the restrictive laws forward. 
Instead, the concern is the effective closure of as many abortion clinics as possible, which is a 
step backwards in terms of protecting women’s reproductive health and safety.  The fact that the 
strategy is not protecting women’s health and safety is clear. The fact that Republicans have 
succeeded in reframing the abortion debate in terms of public health is also clear. What is not 
clear, however, is the true intention of the Republicans who continue to vote for the restrictive 
laws. Yes, the main goal for pro-life organizations has always been centered upon the effective 
overturning of Roe, but can the same be said for state Republican legislators? Are these 
Republicans really supporting the TRAP laws because they have the potential to eliminate 
abortion, or do they have other objectives? 
 From the examples provided by Texas and North Carolina, it is clear that having an 
executive and legislative branch that are dominated by pro-life Republicans makes the entire 
passage of TRAP laws much easier. The laws enacted, despite claims for making the procedure 
safer, are not responsive to women’s health care needs. These ideologically driven laws mirror 
the pro-life ideology of conservative legislators, and it is not a coincidence. TRAP laws are the 
mechanism for preventing abortions and ultimately overturning Roe v. Wade.  
 In the past two decades, abortion rights activists have had to pick their battles against 
restrictive abortion laws carefully, “attempting to challenge only the measures they were 
reasonably confident of defeating at the high court, or at least wouldn’t make significantly 
worse.”264 The meticulous selection of legal challenges is exacerbated in part because of the 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to overturn Roe v. Wade and grant control of legalized abortion to 
the states. As Lithwick observes, “like King Kong perched atop the Empire State building, the 
Court itself has batted away challenge after challenge, content to leave Republican-controlled 	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state legislatures to do all the heavy lifting, as one state after another has tried to make it all but 
impossible to legally terminate a pregnancy.”265 Whether the Court’s reluctance to accept 
abortion cases is intentional is beyond the scope of this paper, and a difficult claim to prove 
nonetheless. What is important to understand, however, is that attempts to return the issue to the 
Supreme Court and overturn Roe v. Wade have been put on the backburner, and as a result, pro-
life activists are looking for an alternative. What they have found is an entirely different but 
potent legislative strategy. 
 In the years since Planned Parenthood v. Casey, this strategy has increasingly gained 
popularity. As Lithwick writes, “after almost six years of being frozen into a sort of WWKD 
(what would Justice Kennedy do?), the reproductive rights landscape seems to have shifted so 
quickly that it almost doesn’t matter what Justice Kennedy would do anymore.”266 The fact that 
the courts are no longer relied upon for change signifies the radical shift in the type of restrictive 
legislation being pushed forward. Since the Court has avoided overturning Roe v. Wade, pro-life 
legislators have adopted a strategy that takes Court precedent out of the equation, targeting those 
who provide the abortion, as opposed to those seeking it. As empirical evidence shows, the 
newfound TRAP law strategy does in fact create an environment where the constitutional right to 
make the decision to have an abortion may be moot, because there are too few providers to 
perform the procedure.267 In other words, “the enactment of a TRAP law represents a 
substantive, as opposed to a merely symbolic, measure of a state’s restrictive abortion policy.”268 
The consequences of TRAP legislation are apparent in the cases of Texas and North Carolina. 
Moreover, the reality of the TRAP law in those states is confirmed by clear empirical evidence. 
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Empirical Evidence 
 Two of the leading researchers who study the TRAP movement are Marshall Medoff and 
Christopher Dennis. In his research, Medoff raises a point that is crucial to properly assessing the 
impact of TRAP laws, namely that they are a recent phenomenon. Despite the recent flood of 
legislation aimed at abortion providers, very little research has examined the impact of those 
types of restrictive state abortion laws. Medoff emphasizes that this is not due to a lack of 
information or data, since the Guttmacher Institute periodically conducts a thorough survey of 
the number of abortion providers. Rather, he argues, since the research related to providers is 
mainly descriptive and documents changes over time, the impact has been difficult to analyze.269 
More importantly, though, is the fact that numerous clinics have already been closed due to the 
new laws. This speaks to the profound impact the new strategy has on access to abortion. This 
causal link is strengthened by the results that both Medoff and Dennis have found in their 
research between the decrease in providers and the increased legislative action.  
 In looking to their analysis, it is important to recall that the new state restrictive abortion 
laws are not directed at a women’s “right to choose,” which was upheld in Casey. Nevertheless, 
the new laws substantially obstruct a woman’s access to abortion. For Medoff and Dennis, the 
two dominant ways in which a law could impede or alter a woman’s pregnancy decision are by 
increasing the out of pocket or emotional costs of obtaining an abortion, or by reducing the 
number of providers.270 As Medoff and Dennis explain, virtually all of the research on the impact 
of restrictive abortion laws has focused on the emotional side related to the women’s right to 
choose.271 After analyzing the less examined side aimed at the providers, they explain why 
restrictive state abortion laws and the subsequent decline in abortion providers merits study. 	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Most importantly, however, they note that the available empirical evidence finds that TRAP laws 
make it more difficult and costly for abortion providers to supply abortion services as a 
consequence of complying with the TRAP laws,272  
 
TRAP laws, enacted under the guise of protecting women’s health, are designed 
to regulate all aspects of the business operations of abortion providers. The intent 
of TRAP laws is to deter physicians from becoming or remaining abortion 
providers. TRAP laws impose on abortion providers medically unnecessary 
requirements and regulations that are calculated to drive abortion providers out of 
practice or make abortions so prohibitively expensive and increasingly difficult to 
obtain that women will no longer be able to afford them or find a provider 
offering abortion services.273 
 
 
Reiterating the evidence seen in both Texas and North Carolina, among other states that have 
adopted restrictive TRAP laws, Medoff and Dennis imply that TRAP laws do not in fact serve 
the purpose of making reproductive health in clinics safer for women. Instead, the real purpose 
of the laws is to regulate business operations in a targeted way and drive out abortion providers. 
What merits further investigation, however, is the resulting impact. That is to say, can the decline 
in abortion providers be causally linked to the decline in reported abortion incidence? If so, will 
the TRAP laws continue to result in a precipitous decline in providers? Also, if there are fewer 
legal providers, are women likely to return to illegal or self-induced forms of abortion? Medoff 
and Dennis claim that through TRAP laws, abortion opponents can effectively overturn the 
Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion.274 Assuming they are right, a new 
legislative strategy could effectively lead to the longstanding goal of pro-life activists. 
 Although Medoff’s and Dennis’ studies cannot provide a direct causal connection 
between abortion providers and the true objectives of legislators who support TRAP laws, their 
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analysis of several theories presents a convincing argument that mirrors the evidence seen in 
states like Texas and North Carolina. First, Medoff and Dennis counter a 1957 study that linked 
the behavior of policymakers to the preferences of their constituents. Instead, they measure the 
enactment of TRAP laws though observations of partisan political party abortion ideology in 
conjunction with partisan political control of state government and conclude, after controlling for 
other variables, that “lawmakers are not influenced by the abortion attitudes of their constituents 
in enacting a TRAP law.”275 This is important, because it shows that the restrictive TRAP laws 
that are being enacted reflect not a conservative political constituency within a state, but 
represent the independent motives of state office holders. This was the case in North Carolina. 
Although 80 percent of North Carolina voters objected to including abortion restrictions in a 
motorcycle bill, and 35,000 North Carolinians signed a petition urging Governor McCrory to 
veto the restrictive legislation, the Governor signed the bill.276 Governor McCrory and 
Lieutenant Governor Tillis are both ideological opposed to abortion, and their indifference to the 
public’s general opposition shows that ideological opposition to abortion is independent of the 
beliefs of the majority of a state’s constituents. In other words, defeating pro-life legislation 
becomes all the more difficult when the majority of those who support it identify as pro-life in a 
Republican controlled pro-life state.  
 The evidence both at the state level and in empirical studies indicates a larger 
conservative Republican ideological goal: to prevent abortion. To reiterate Medoff and Dennis’ 
findings, the implicit or explicit intent of TRAP laws is to “effectively overturn the Supreme 
Court’s Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion by driving abortion providers out of practice 
and making it extremely difficult for women to exercise their legal right to choose to have an 	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abortion.”277 This is precisely what was seen in Texas’s lower Rio Grande Valley, in which over 
200,000 women of reproductive age are now forced to travel over eight hours if they wish to 
simply access an abortion provider.278 The problematic nature of TRAP legislation makes clear 
that the laws are not being promoted as a means to making abortion safer. As Medoff and Dennis 
explain, “the enactment of TRAP law by states represents an ambiguous, direct, unmistakable, 
and substantive measure of a state’s restrictive abortion policy.”279 Considering that abortion is a 
major social and political electoral issue for both Republicans and Democrats, it makes sense 
that the Republican Party would choose to use its control of state government to enact the 
restrictive laws. Furthermore, the empirical evidence supports this:  
 
The anti-abortion ideology of the Republican Party, in conjunction with the 
institutional control of the legislative and executive branches of the state 
government, suggest that the enactment of TRAP laws is more likely when the 
Republican Party controls both houses of the state legislature and the governor’s 
office.280 
 
Full Republican control of state government facilitates the passage of laws that are ideological 
driven and not responsive to any real healthcare needs.  
 
Looking Forward 
 The most recent “Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States” 
report released by the Guttmacher Institute shows a steady decline in the abortion rate from 2008 
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to 2011, about 4-5% per year, or 13% over the entire 3 year span.281 In 2011, the year with the 
lowest rate since 1973, there were 1.06 million abortions, and the abortion rate was 16.9 per 
1,000 women.282 Given the fact that there were four restrictive TRAP laws aimed at abortion 
providers in 2005,283 as compared to the 27 laws that were enacted by 2013,284 it is reasonable to 
conclude that the decline in abortion incidence from 2008 to 2011 is largely attributable to the 
subsequent increase in TRAP laws. Although Guttmacher does not go so far as to directly link 
the decline in abortion incidence to the influx of TRAP laws, the report considers several related 
factors.   
 For example, the researchers for the report, Rachael K. Jones and Jenna Jerman, explain 
that “the closure of even one facility that is unable to meet TRAP regulations has the potential to 
affect several hundred, or even several thousand women.”285  They explain that while the number 
of facilities did not change drastically between 2008 and 2011, the disruption in services may 
have contributed to the 19% decline in abortion incidence. In other words, if a facility’s 
clinicians were unable to obtain hospital-admitting privileges, it is possible that scheduling legal 
abortion procedures would become increasingly difficult. The procedure would become less 
accessible for the woman, and she would then have to wait longer for an appointment. This 
hypothetical scenario is not far off from the impact that House Bill 2 had on Texas, as described 
in Chapter 3.   
 Of course, the report also cites Oregon and Illinois as states in which abortion incidence 
has largely decreased, despite any new restrictions being enacted.286 Given that both of these 	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states have predominantly pro-choice legislatures, the lack of restrictive legislation could 
potentially be explained by a lack of conservative leadership. The Oregon and Illinois examples 
support the notion that Republican legislators have come to play the most crucial role in 
restricting access to abortion. Although the report does not make a direct causal connection 
between restrictive legislation and the decline in abortion incidence, the apparent connection 
should be understood to be an influential factor, especially looking forward. The report, 
published in 2014, tracked the abortion incidence leading up to the first half of 2011. Given that 
a majority of restrictive legislation was passed in 2011, primarily in the second half of the year, it 
would not inform data in the incidence report for 2011.287 Therefore, the true impact of the new 
restrictive TRAP laws may be predicated upon the next published incidence report for the 
Guttmacher Institute.  
 For legislators in support of abortion, efforts have been made to stop the influx of TRAP 
laws. Pro-choice legislation has been proposed at the federal level to counteract the restrictive 
abortion law strategy. In November of 2013, Senators Richard Blumenthal and Tammy Baldwin,  
and Representatives Judy Chu, Lois Frankel and Marcia Fudge, all Democrats, introduced a bill 
called the Women’s Health Protection Act. The bill was an effort to reaffirm Roe and Casey “by 
pre-empting state efforts to enact measures like heartbeat bills, fetal pain legislation, and 
regulations that result in clinic closures, added expenses, and unnecessary delays,” and would 
force states to prove that their legislation actually had a significant health reason for its 
enactment.288 Despite the evident optimism that the bill represents for pro-choice advocates, the 
bill is estimated to never pass the GOP-controlled House. Yet, as Dahlia Lithwick explains, 
“what’s important is that it represents Democrats, including male Democrats, “taking a strong, 	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long-overdue stand against state efforts to simply nullify Roe v. Wade with legislation that 
assumes Roe has already been overruled.”289  
 Democratic action counters the apparent, coordinated effort that pro-life Republicans 
embrace. TRAP legislation has replaced laws aimed at limiting a woman’s right to choose as the 
new potent and effective strategy adopted by pro-life advocates and legislators in states 
controlled by those who are ideologically opposed to abortion. The impact of this strategy has 
yet to be measured but as seen in Texas and North Carolina, is expected to have a resounding 
impact on women’s access to clinics. If all of the provisions are enacted as scheduled and fully 
applied, Texas will be left with a mere five clinics, and North Carolina one. This will affect not 
only access to abortion, but also other essential reproductive health services provided by the 
clinics. As AUL publicist Kristin Stone Hamrick noted, “A lot of people assume Roe is 
untouchable, and we disagree…we have a template of legislation that will roll back Roe.”290 The 
same can be said for conservative politicians who have reveled in the success of their legislative 
efforts, like Governor Rick Perry of Texas and Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant. The intentions 
are becoming increasingly clear, but the ability to stop the movement is not. As pro-choice 
researcher and journalist Abby Scher aptly suggests “the well-oiled machine that is the anti-
abortion movement in the states will only really be stopped in two ways: in the courts or by 
retaking the state legislatures.”291  
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[Drafter’s Note:  The best candidates for this legislation have an established record of enacting 
protective legislation such as comprehensive informed consent requirements, parental consent, 
XOWUDVRXQGUHTXLUHPHQWVDQGFRPSUHKHQVLYHDQGVSHFL¿FDOO\WDUJHWHGDERUWLRQFOLQLFUHJXOD-
tions.  Moreover, several issues will need to be carefully considered before introducing this 
legislation including whether or not the administration of abortion-inducing drugs such as RU-
ZLOOEHVSHFL¿FDOO\FRYHUHGRUH[FOXGHG0RUHRYHUVWDWHVWKDWKDYHDERUWLRQFOLQLFUHJX-
ODWLRQVDOUHDG\RQWKHERRNVPD\DOVRZDQWWRFRQVLGHUHQDFWLQJVSHFL¿FDPEXODWRU\VXUJLFDO
FHQWHUVWDQGDUGVWRUHPHG\QRWHGGH¿FLHQFLHVLQWKHH[LVWLQJUHJXODWLRQV3OHDVHFRQWDFW$8/
for assistance on this legislation.]
HOUSE/SENATE BILL No. ______
By Representatives/Senators ____________
Section 1.  Title.
7KLV$FWPD\EHNQRZQDQGFLWHGDVWKH³$ERUWLRQ3DWLHQWV¶(QKDQFHG6DIHW\$FW´
Section 2.  Legislative Findings and Purposes.
(a) The [Legislature] of the State of [Insert name of State@¿QGVWKDW
(1) The [vast majority] of all abortions in this State are performed in clinics devot-
ed solely to providing abortions [and family planning services].  Most women 
who seek abortions at these facilities do not have any relationship with the 
physician who performs the abortion either before or after the procedure and 
they do not return to the facility for post-surgical care.  In most instances, the 
woman’s only actual contact with the abortion provider occurs simultaneously 
with the abortion procedure, with little opportunity to ask questions about the 
procedure, potential complications, and proper follow-up care.
(2) For most abortions, the woman arrives at the clinic on the day of the procedure, 
has the procedure in a room within the clinic, and recovers under the care of 
clinic staff, all without a hospital admission.
(3) “The medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an abortion are 
VHULRXVDQGFDQEHODVWLQJ«´H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981).
(4) Abortion is an invasive surgical procedure that can lead to numerous and seri-
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(11) Patients who elect to have surgery in an ASC arrive on the day of the proce-
dure, have the surgery in an operating room, and recover under the care of the 
nursing staff, all without a hospital admission.
(b) %DVHGRQWKH¿QGLQJVLQVXEVHFWLRQDRIWKLV$FWWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLV$FWDUH
(1) 7RGH¿QHFHUWDLQDERUWLRQFOLQLFVDV³DPEXODWRU\VXUJLFDOFHQWHUV´>or other ap-
propriate term as used in existing state statutes, administrative rules, or other 
regulatory material(s)] under the laws of this State, and to subject them to li-
censing and regulation as such.
(2) To promote and enforce the highest standard for care and safety in facilities 
performing abortions in this State.
(3) To provide for the protection of public health through the establishment and 
enforcement of a high standard of care and safety in abortion clinics.
(4) To regulate the provision of abortion consistent with and to the extent permit-
ted by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
6HFWLRQ'H¿QLWLRQV  
As used in this Act only:  
(a) “Abortion´PHDQVWKHDFWRIXVLQJRUSUHVFULELQJDQ\LQVWUXPHQW>,medicine, drug, or 
any other substance, device, or means]2 with the intent to terminate the clinically diagnosable 
pregnancy of a woman, with knowledge that the termination by those means will with reason-
able likelihood cause the death of the unborn child. Such use [, prescription, or means] is not 
an abortion if done with the intent to: 
 (1) Save the life or preserve the health of the unborn child;
 (2) Remove a dead unborn child caused by spontaneous abortion; or
 (3) Remove an ectopic pregnancy.
27KLVODQJXDJHLVXVHGZKHQVWDWHRI¿FLDOVLQWHQGWKHUHJXODWLRQVSUHVFULEHGKHUHLQWRDSSO\WRWKHSURYLVLRQRIFKHPLFDODERUWLRQV
(such as the use of RU-486).
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(b) “Abortion clinic´PHDQVDIDFLOLW\RWKHUWKDQDQDFFUHGLWHGKRVSLWDOLQZKLFK¿YHRU
PRUH¿UVWWULPHVWHUDERUWLRQVLQDQ\PRQWKRUDQ\VHFRQGRUWKLUGWULPHVWHUDERUWLRQVDUHSHU-
formed. 
(c) “Department´PHDQVWKH>Insert name of state department or agency that licenses and 
regulates ambulatory surgical centers or similar state-regulated entities] of the State of [Insert 
name of State].
6HFWLRQ6WDWXWRU\'H¿QLWLRQRI³$PEXODWRU\6XUJLFDO&HQWHU´>Or Other Appropriate 
Term@0RGL¿HGWR,QFOXGH&HUWDLQ)DFLOLWLHV3HUIRUPLQJ$ERUWLRQV
(a) The term “ambulatory surgical center´>or other appropriate term as used in existing 
state statutes, administrative rules, or other regulatory material(s)] as used in [,QVHUWVSHFL¿F
reference(s) to state statute(s), administrative rules, or other regulatory material(s) governing 
ambulatory surgical centers or similar state-regulated entities] shall include abortion clinics 
which do not provide services or other accommodations for abortion patients to stay more than 
twenty-three (23) hours within the clinic.
(b) All ambulatory surgical centers [or other appropriate term as used in existing state 
statutes, administrative rules, or other regulatory material(s)] operating in this State, including 
abortion clinics, must meet the licensing and regulatory standards prescribed in [,QVHUWVSHFL¿F
reference(s) to state statute(s), administrative rules, or other regulatory material(s) providing 
licensing and regulatory standards for ambulatory surgical centers or similar state-regulated 
entities].
Section 5.  Criminal Penalties. 
:KRHYHURSHUDWHVDQDERUWLRQFOLQLFDVGH¿QHGLQWKLV$FWZLWKRXWDYDOLGDPEXODWRU\VXUJL-
cal center [or other appropriate term as used in existing state statute(s), administrative rules, 
or other regulatory material(s)] license issued by the Department is guilty of a [Insert proper 
ISHQDOW\RIIHQVHFODVVL¿FDWLRQ].
Section 6.  Civil Penalties and Fines.
D $Q\YLRODWLRQRIWKLV$FWPD\EHVXEMHFWWRDFLYLOSHQDOW\RU¿QHXSWR>Insert appro-
priate amount] imposed by the Department.
(b) Each day of violation constitutes a separate violation for purposes of assessing civil 
SHQDOWLHVRU¿QHV
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